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1 Abstract 
 Since 1980s, debates over efficiency of current tort system have encouraged various 
researches on healthcare cost and quality pertaining to the changes in tort pressure, and 
tort reforms are frequently used as exogenous changes to tort liability to study healthcare 
provider behaviors. 
 
In the first chapter, I examine the effect of medical malpractice liability on obstetric 
practice pattern, in particular, whether the effect varies by patient health condition. I 
extend Janet Currie and Bentley MacLeod (2008)’s model that allows for variation of 
patient’s health conditions by relaxing the assumption of purely altruistic physicians. The 
model predicts that the effects of tort reforms will be mostly concentrated on patients 
with better health conditions. I use two types of tort reform, specifically Caps on Punitive 
Damages (CPD) and modification of Joint and Several Liability (JSL), in New Jersey to 
test our theoretical predictions and find consistent empirical evidence. 
 
The second chapter investigates the relationship between medical malpractice liability 
and the effect of hospital competition on quality of services provided to patients who are 
covered by private insurance in one of the more frequently sued practices, obstetrics. 
Medical malpractice lawsuit may send negative quality signals to the consumers, and 
reduce hospital’s market power by increasing quality elasticity of demand among 
consumers. Therefore, hospitals in a market where consumers are more sensitive to 
quality may compete over quality more than price. Consistent with theoretical prediction, 
the findings suggests that hospitals in markets where malpractice lawsuits are frequently 
)!!
filed and jury verdicts are frequently awarded use resources more efficiently, and provide 
better care.  
  
%!!
 
2 Tort Reform and Obstetric Practice: The Role of Heterogeneity in Patient Health 
in Physician Effort and Altruism 
2.1 Introduction 
Amid various concerns related to the reform of healthcare financing and delivery in the 
United States is an ongoing discussion over the role of tort reform. The call for or against 
tort reform has become increasingly contentious. Those in favor of tort reform claim that 
the incentives for excessive numbers of lawsuits that arise from the fractured medical 
liability system in combination with the risk aversion of physicians lead to excessive 
medical testing and procedures, so called defensive medicine,1 which raises costs and 
unnecessarily consumes scarce resources. The opponents of tort reform rebut the claim 
that reducing tort liability would curb cost, suggesting this argument is a “red-herring” 
that has been repeated often enough that it is taken as truth rather than properly 
scrutinized (Underwood, 2009).  
 
Opponents of tort reform claim that current tort liability is not an actual driver of the 
increasing medical costs as it is often blamed to be. Rather, they argue that current 
system provides appropriate recourse for those who have suffered losses to seek adequate 
compensation for those losses. Furthermore, inefficiencies introduced by changing the 
current system may be further exacerbated if physicians do respond to reduced liability 
pressure by taking less care, because more individuals will wind up with worse than 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'!/0"1!1234"5"46778!935391!:;!2;1":"#3!<353=1"#3!>3<"4"=3?!@0"40!"1!2081"4"6=A1!611B96=43!C306#";9!:;!93<B43!>3<"467!>672964:"43!9"1D?!1B40!61!;9<39"=E!B==34311698!:31:1?!935399"=E!:;!4;=1B7:6=:1?!;9!2395;9>"=E!B==33<3<!29;43<B931$!
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expected health outcomes and may be unable to seek what would be considered proper 
recompense. Apparently, these arguments hinge on a very fundamental question: “How 
would the doctors alter their practice patterns in response to changes in tort liability?” 
 
The complex incentives created by the tort reforms have led to mixed conclusions among 
previous studies that assess the effect of tort reform on physicians' treatment decisions. 
For example, in a seminal work, Kessler and McClellan (1996) empirically demonstrate 
that elderly Medicare beneficiaries with cardiac diseases underwent fewer procedures 
without a significant effect on their health outcomes in lower liability environments. 
They categorize the reforms into the ones that legislate reduced malpractice awards 
(direct reforms) and ones that redistribute financial liability exposure during a 
malpractice lawsuit (indirect reforms). Using similar categorization of tort reforms, 
however, Sloan and Shadle (2009) find that tort reforms have no significant effect on 
either medical decisions or patient health outcomes. While it is important to investigate 
the overall effect of tort reform, these mixed findings really point to the need to examine 
the effects of specific types of reform on specific fields of medicine. It is possible that 
different types of reform have conflicting effects on physician behaviors that are 
concealed from overall effects.  In a recent study by Currie and MacLeod (2008), they 
show that in obstetrics, the Joint and Several Liability reform reduces complications of 
labor and C-section use, whereas caps on noneconomic damages increase them. Their 
findings suggest the importance to evaluate the effects of specific tort reforms 
independently, as those effects may work against each other. 
 
*!!
In this chapter, we follow Currie and MacLeod (2008) to exploit two specific types of tort 
reform that occurred in New Jersey since 1995: Caps on Punitive Damages (CPD) and 
modification of Joint and Several Liability (JSL) rule on the physician's practice pattern 
(C-section rates). Obstetrics is a medical specialty with high professional liability 
exposure. In the ACOG's 2009 survey, nearly 91% of ob-gyns had experienced at least 
one liability claim filed against them during their professional careers (American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 2009). Thus, it is not surprising that many researchers 
have used obstetrics to study the impact of medical malpractice on physicians' behaviors. 
 
Previous studies on the impact of malpractice pressure on C-section rates have yielded 
mixed results. One possible explanation for the mixed results is that most of these studies 
ignore the heterogeneous impacts of malpractice pressure along the patient severity 
distribution.2 Intuitively, at least for a small proportion of deliveries that have a clear 
medical indication for cesarean, malpractice pressure should have no impact on 
obstetricians' choice. For the rest that are open to discretion, malpractice pressure may or 
may not have an impact. Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that the impacts of malpractice 
pressure on physicians' behaviors vary by patient severity. 
 

.!!
We make contributions to the literature by examining whether the impacts of malpractice 
pressure on physicians' practice patterns vary by patient health condition. First, we extend 
Currie and MacLeod (2008)'s model that allows for variation of patient's conditions by 
relaxing the assumption of purely altruistic physicians. We allow for the variations of 
physician's response to patient's health status upon admission through disentangling 
physician's incentives to take more care (altruistic character), incentives to perform 
lucrative, quick or convenient procedures (non-altruistic character) and incentives to 
avoid lawsuit (pertaining to the risk associated with procedure choice). Our model 
predicts that the effects of tort reforms will be mostly concentrated on healthier patients.  
Second, we use hospital claims data provided by the Pennsylvania Healthcare Cost 
Containment Council (PHC4) and Health Care Utilization Project, New Jersey (HCUP-
NJ) from 1994 to 2005 to empirically test our theoretical predictions. Our results suggest 
a statistically significant change in physician's practice pattern after reforms in tort status. 
Moreover, we find that most of these effects are concentrated in relatively healthy 
patients. 
 
While comprehensive national examinations of tort reform are insightful, there are 
several strengths to focus on one state's tort reforms. First, several longitudinal studies 
(Kessler and McClellan 1996; Currie and MacLeod 2008; Sloan and Shadle 2009) use 
national data and state fixed effects to identify the impact of medical malpractice liability 
on physicians' practice patterns. However, in spite of the discussions around tort reform 
and its potential effects on medical costs, many modern tort reforms were not enacted in 
response to the specific concern of rising medical liability. Rather, many reforms have 
(!!
been lobbied for and enacted for general personal injury, property or other interests' 
damages.3 Thus, existing state-level tort laws are often heterogeneous in their focus on 
medical malpractice as well as in the degree of liability they expose a physician to, 
despite being similar in name and legal language. By focusing on one state, we can 
measure changes in tort liability using active/non-active status of specific tort reforms to 
avoid heterogeneity issues in tort legal status. A directly related advantage by doing so is 
that we estimate the effect of changes in potential tort liability. Past studies are focused 
on the impacts of observed tort actions to the physician (medical malpractice claim 
payouts or history) or in the physician's area of practice (medical malpractice insurance 
premium). However, if one reads trade journals, it is evident that in medicine any law 
changes effecting malpractice or tort law and the potential consequences of these changes 
on the physician are often highlighted. Thus, changes in the physician's behavior may 
happen absent being slapped with a medical malpractice suit or having insurance 
premiums increase due to public information on the potential effects of the change. 
 
Second, New Jersey enacted JSL reform in the third quarter of 1995 and CPD in the last 
quarter of 1995, while the adjacent state Pennsylvania enacted similar JSL reform in the 
second quarter of 2002, and CPD for medical malpractice in the last quarter of 1996. This 
series of reforms allows us to use difference-in-differences (DD) specifications to 
estimate the causal effects of tort reform. We first by examining changes in delivery 
methods between 1994 and 1996 for pregnant women in New Jersey that had tort reforms 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%S;9!3N6>273!T3==187#6="6A1!'&&(!4621!;=!2B=":"#3!<6>6E31!@393!1234"5"46778!3=64:3<!:;!93<B43!:03!>3<"467!7"6C"7":8?!@0"73!:03!4621!"=!U3@!V39138!62278!:;!677!:;9:1$!T3==187#6="6A1!)--)!R;"=:!6=<!13#3967!7"6C"7":8!76@!406=E3!@61!"=!9312;=13!:;!674;0;7!139#"=E!31:6C7"10>3=:!;@=39A1!4;=439=1!;#39!C3"=E!7"6C73!5;9!C69:3=<391!139#"=E!;#3978!"=:;N"46:3<!26:9;=1$!!
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in 1995 relative to pregnant women in Pennsylvania that did not have any tort reform 
during that period. Then, we note that with the enactment of tort reforms in Pennsylvania 
in 2002, New Jersey became a natural control state; we exploit this “reverse experiment” 
to confirm our earlier findings. 
 
Third, because the tort law environment was dynamic in the two states during the period 
we examined, we are also able to assess the degree to which specific reforms can 
counteract one another when enacted within a short time interval of one another, a 
consideration we have not seen addressed in the literature.4 Indeed we find the effects of 
these two reforms (JSL reform and CPD) countervail each other if both reforms were 
enacted in the adjacent quarters, which provides insights on previous insignificant 
findings on tort reforms especially when states enact countervailing tort reforms 
simultaneously. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II reviews current tort reform 
literature and obstetrics practice pattern. Section III presents the theoretical model. 
Section IV describes the data, and empirical specifications are specified in Section V. 
Section VI discusses the empirical results and robustness checks. Section VII extends the 
discussions on the patient autonomy. Conclusions follow in Section VIII. 
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2.2 Background and Literature Review 
2.2.1 CPD and JSL Reforms in New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania were both identified as the states facing medical 
malpractice crises in the 1990s (Mello, Studdert and Brennan 2003). Both states also 
experienced tort reforms, particularly the CPD and JSL reforms, during our study period 
(1994-2005).5 
 
Punitive damages are awarded in addition to economic and noneconomic damages in 
order to punish “willful or wanton misconduct or reckless indifference to the rights of 
others.” Policymaker's interest in this type of reform is ostensibly due to the potential 
domino effect capping these damages would have on reigning in the increasing medical 
costs in the United States. First, these caps would lower the expected payout conditional 
upon winning a suit by taking the decision of non-economic and punitive damage awards 
out of the hands of juries who are thought to be more sympathetic to the plaintiffs in 
these cases. The secondary effect of limited caps would be that the incentive for a lawyer 
to advise a client to file suit would be lower if the expected payout were lower ceteris 
paribus. The tertiary effect of such a change in incentives would be that both the 
probability of being sued and expected limit on the payout conditional upon being sued 
would be lower and therefore lower malpractice premiums. Taken together, these three 
effects of punitive damage caps could reduce the level of liability facing by physicians. 
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JSL rules determine the distribution of financial liability arising from tort actions in 
relation to culpability in the context of multiple tortfeasors. If there are multiple 
defendants involved in a lawsuit, the conventional JSL rule allows a plaintiff to recover 
full damages from any of the defendants found to have a non-zero amount of culpability, 
with many specifying a minimum amount of culpability to qualify under the JSL rule.  
For example some states will only allow a “deep pockets” approach to seeking 
recompense if the defendant with the “deep pockets” is found to be at least 20% culpable 
for the error. Prior to the modification of the JSL rule in each of the states, the so-called 
“deep pockets” rules were in effect. This allowed plaintiffs to collect the damages in the 
full amount awarded in a malpractice case from the defendant with the highest ability to 
pay. In the case of malpractice lawsuit faced by any physician, if there is any culpability 
of physician's nurse, then employer of the nurse, usually the hospital will be named in the 
lawsuit as one of the defendants as well. Under such a regime, physicians face lower 
malpractice risk because hospitals are usually the ones with deeper pockets. 
 
The New Jersey legislature enacted JSL reform in June 1995 (the third quarter of 1995). 
Under the preceding JSL regime in New Jersey, the plaintiff could recover the full 
amount of all damages from any party that was found to be 20% or more responsible, or 
over 60% for non-economic damages. The 1995 reform raised the fault cutoff to 60% and 
over for all damages. In the case of each party's negligence being less than that amount, 
the respective proportion of damages would be recovered from the respective parties. 
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In October 1995, the New Jersey legislature enacted CPD. The specific cap was set at the 
greater of five times the amount of compensatory (economic and non-economic) damages 
or $350,000 (Public Law 1995, Ch. 142, N.J.S.A 2A: 15-5.9 et seq.). Besides directly 
capping the awards, the legislation also requires a bifurcated trial6 when suing for 
punitive damages as well as convincing evidence7 of malicious conduct. 
 
Although the Pennsylvania legislature moved to reform their tort law later than New 
Jersey, some of the reforms specifically targeted medical liability. In January 1997, 
punitive damage awards were capped at the greater of two times the compensatory 
damages awarded or $100,000. Physicians and other medical providers became the only 
group with such protection. This legislation was repealed (Avraham 2010) and was 
replaced by a sweeping set of reforms in March 2002 (Kersh 2005). Confronted with 
ongoing debates on the issue and concerns over the perception that physicians would 
leave the state, the Pennsylvania legislature initiated the Medical Care Availability and 
Reduction of Error Act (MCARE) in March 2002 (Kersh 2005). MCARE addresses 
issues in patient safety, legal reform and provider malpractice insurance reconstruction 
with the goal of ending the malpractice crisis. For example, it claims that “if punitive 
damages are awarded in a medical malpractice case arising on or after March 20th, 2002, 
25 percent of the awards must be paid into the MCARE Fund rather than the prevailing 
party.” The effect of such a change reduces the payout conditional upon winning, and this 
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may deter patients and their lawyers from filing for medical malpractice against 
physicians. Thus we consider it as a new cap on the damage awarded. 
 
In a subsequent legislative action, the Pennsylvania legislature also modified the JSL rule 
in June 2002,8 enacting the same criterion that had been put in place in New Jersey in 
1995. Interestingly, the call for changes to the JSL rules enacted in Pennsylvania was not 
driven by medical malpractice concerns. Instead they were driven by the proprietors of 
bars and restaurants who were concerned about their own liability resulting from 
bartenders who were found to be responsible for serving additional drinks to patrons that 
were already visibly intoxicated. Nonetheless, the JSL modifications applied to all cases 
with multiple tortfeasors, including medical torts. 
 
The CPD and JSL reforms in New Jersey and Pennsylvania are summarized in Figure 
2.1. These tort reforms allow us to construct a series of “natural experiments” to examine 
the impacts on physicians' treatment decisions. Specifically, we will examine the New 
Jersey tort reforms in 1995 by comparing the outcome changes of pregnant women in 
New Jersey relative to the outcome changes of pregnant women in Pennsylvania that had 
no tort reforms between 1994 and 1996. Then we conduct a "reverse experiment" to 
identify the effects of JSL and CPD in Pennsylvania using pregnant women in New 
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Jersey as a comparison group between 1996 and 1998 for the CPD reform and between 
2001 and 2003 for the JSL reform. 
 
However, there are several caveats when using Pennsylvania as a “reverse experiment” to 
identify the effect of CPD. First, if a specific tort reform was passed for the purpose of 
reducing healthcare provider's medical liability or the number of medical malpractice 
lawsuits, healthcare providers such as physicians and hospital administrators may change 
their behaviors prior to the official enactment date of such reforms. CPD reforms in 1997 
and in 2002 under MCARE in Pennsylvania are potentially problematic in this regard, 
because they were intended to reduce medical liability. Second, the constitutionality of 
the CPD reform in 1997 in Pennsylvania was not as certain as those implemented in New 
Jersey. It was not initially clear that the caps would hold because of provisions in the 
Pennsylvania constitution, which limit legislative efforts to put caps on damages in tort 
awards. Challenges to the cap on punitive damages were successful in weakening the 
imposition of caps on punitive damages (Kersh 2005). In addition, these caps may be 
ineffective because there is little direction given to juries other than telling them that 
punitive damages may be awarded if the defendant's conduct was outrageous. Again, in 
Pennsylvania the caps on punitive damages would not hold in cases where there was 
willful misconduct. 
 
2.2.2 Cesarean Section and Medical Malpractice 
Obstetric care has a few features that make it an interesting, as well as complex, area of 
medical practice to study the impacts of tort reform on the provider-patient interaction as 
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it relates to treatment choice. First is that the initial patient-physician interaction occurs 
well in advance of the administration of the choice of the progression of treatment9, thus 
search costs are lower than in a critical acute care situation. A correlate of this feature is 
that there is also an opportunity for independent information gathering as it pertains to the 
main treatment decision, that is, what set of conditions need to be met for the patient to 
attempt or continue with trial-of-labor (TOL) rather than opting for a cesarean section (C-
section). A second interesting aspect to obstetric care is that there are substantial cost 
differences in the two treatment opinions, with C-section costing more than vaginal birth 
on average.10 As Gruber and Owings (1996) indicates that physicians do responds to such 
financial incentives (as well as non-financial incentives such as time convenience) 
associated with performing a C-section. 
 
The high C-section rates in the U.S. have also drawn a lot of attentions from researchers 
and policy makers. The percentage of births delivered by cesarean in the U.S. has been 
rising steadily in the past 15 years, from 20.7% in 1996 to a record-high of 32.9% in 
2009, showing no signs of slowing (Hamilton, Martin and Ventura 2010). The cesarean 
section rates are much higher than the earlier recommended maximum rates of 10%-15% 
by World Health Organization (1985). The four leading indicators responsible for most of 
the rise in cesarean rates ! previous cesarean, dystocia, breech presentation, and fetal
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distress !  are clinical grey areas (Shearer 1993) conferring the least clear-cut benefits 
and leaving great rooms for intrusion of non-medical considerations.11 Recent studies 
suggest that “changing primary cesarean rates were not related to general shifts in 
mothers' medical risk profiles or patient-related reasons such as pre-pregnancy obesity, 
macrosomia etc. (Rhodes, Schoendorf and Parker 2003; Lu, Rouse, DuBard, Cliver, 
Kimberlin and Hauth 2001; Kaiser and Kirby 2001); rather, changes in obstetric practices 
were the major influence on the shifting pattern of primary cesarean rates” (Eugene 
Declercq and MacDorman 2005; Declercq, Menacker and MacDorman 2006; 
MacDorman, Menacker and Declercq 2011). Indeed, in economics literature, researchers 
have associated the cesarean section rates with physicians' greater financial incentives to 
perform the procedure (Gruber and Owings 1996; Gruber 1999), physicians' greater 
demand for leisure (Brown III 1996) and physicians' fear of being named in a medical 
malpractice suit. 
 
Past literature examining the impacts of tort liability on physicians' behaviors generally 
regards cesarean delivery as defensive medicine. The reasoning is that most of prime 
areas for obstetrical litigation are associated with a failure or delayed cesarean section 
(Shwayder 2007). Thus, most studies examine whether the positive association between 
risk of liability and cesarean delivery exists. A number of previous studies have found a 
positive association between malpractice claims experience or malpractice insurance 
premiums and cesarean section rates (Tussing and Wojtowycz 1992; Localio, Lawthers
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Bengtson, Hebert, Weaver, Brennan and Landis 1993; Dubay et al. 1999; Murthy, 
Grobman, Lee and Holl 2007; Yang, Mello, Subramanian and Studdert 2009; Grant and 
McInnes 2004), while others have found no such relationship (Baldwin, Hart, Lloyd, 
Fordyce and Rosenblatt 1995; Sloan, Entman, Reilly, Glass, Hickson and Zhang 1997; 
Baicker and Chandra 2005; Beomsoo 2007; Gimm 2010). In this chapter, we do not 
directly impose the assumption that C-section is defensive medicine. Instead, we make 
two assumptions based on medical literature in our theoretical framework described in 
the next section. 
 
First, we assume the medical error rate associated with C-section is always higher than 
the medical error rate associated with vaginal delivery. This assumption is legitimate 
given that cesarean deliveries are generally associated with higher infant mortality rates 
(NCHS) and higher risks of maternal death (Harper, Byington, Espeland, Naughton, 
Meyer and Lane 2003). This positive association, to a large extent, could reflect a higher 
risk profile of those who experience a cesarean delivery. Nevertheless, our assumption 
does not distinguish whether the C-section is medically necessary. A higher medical error 
rate of C-section could be due to existing medical conditions that lead to both a cesarean 
delivery and worse outcomes. It could also be due to the risks of cesarean delivery itself. 
Second, we assume that the medical error rate associated with C-section relative to the 
medical error rate associated with vaginal delivery is larger when the patient is relatively 
healthier. That is, the C-section is relatively riskier for healthy patients. According to the 
literature, cesarean delivery on maternal request was moderately associated with: (1) an 
increased risk of maternal hemorrhage; (2) longer maternal length of stay; and (3) an 
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increased risk of neonatal respiratory morbidity (National Institute of Health 2006). 
Several studies published after the 2006 NIH conference provided stronger evidence 
showing the harms of unnecessary cesarean delivery. For example, a planned cesarean 
delivery is associated with a higher rate of transfer to the NICU and a higher risk for 
pulmonary disorders (Kolas, Saugstad, Daltveit, Nilsen and Øian 2006); higher risks of 
severe maternal morbidity (Liu, Liston, Joseph, Heaman, Sauve and Kramer 2007) and 
higher neonatal mortality rates (MacDorman, Declercq, Menacker and Malloy 2008). 
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
2.3.1 Basic Setup 
In this study, we investigate the effects of tort reforms on C-section rate in obstetrics. 
Disentangling various incentives facing the physicians, we extend Currie and MacLeod 
(2008)'s work and construct a theoretical model that allows for the variations of the 
physician's behaviors that result from her patients' health conditions upon admission. The 
physician's reduced form utility function is defined as !"#$ %$ &'($ )* + ,-"#$ %"#$ &'(*$ )* . ,/"#$ &'($ )* 0 ,1"%"#$ &'(*$ #$ )* 
 
The benefit of treating a patient (B) depends on the patient's severity upon admission (s), 
the physician's effort in treating his/her patient (%) and procedure choice (p). Physician's 
effort (%) is a function of patient's severity (s) and the tort law when the patient is treated 
(law). Procedure choice p=C indicates that cesarean section is performed and p=V 
indicates that vaginal delivery is performed. A higher s indicates that the patient has more 
medical indications that increase the risk of adverse outcomes during the delivery 
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process. One major difference of our model is that we introduce physician's effort into the 
benefit function.12 The purpose is to incorporate physician's multifaceted, yet potentially 
conflicting, incentives to the process of his/her treatment decision. We assume that the 
benefit function has a quadratic form in patient severity. Firstly, a physician has 
incentives to treat healthier patients to save time and effort (non-altruistic motivation). 
Because %2 3 4 and -5 6 4, it implies that -5%2 ,6 4. Secondly, a physician gains more 
intrinsic rewards by treating more severe patients or a physician takes patients' benefits 
into consideration and patients' benefit of treatment is an increasing function of patient's 
severity (altruistic motivation), -2 3 4.13 Thirdly, physicians are more likely to comply 
with patient autonomy in terms of treatment choice when the patient is healthier.14 That 
is, physician’s altruistic benefits accruing from yielding patients' wishes decrease with 
patient severity, -2 6 4. 
 
The physician's perceived tort liability is denoted by the product of the expected payout, 
given the physician is being sued (H) and the probability a medical error occurs (e). The 
expected payout is a function of the patient's health status (s), tort law at the time of 
treatment and physician's procedure choice. Independent from the tort environment, we 
assume that the medical error rate (e) is a function of physician's effort, patient's severity`aKP1!"1!4;=43=:96:3<!"=!@;>3=!;5!0"E039!1;4";34;=;>"4!1:6:B1$!H0"73!@3!<;!=;:!<"934:78!6<<9311!26:"3=:!6B:;=;>8!"=!:0"1!4062:39?!;B9!>;<37!6=<!3>2"9"467!931B7:1!06#3!2;:3=:"67!">27"46:";=1!5;9!:03!LB31:";=!;5!:03!:;9:!3=#"9;=>3=:!">264:!;=!26:"3=:!6B:;=;>8$!
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and procedure choice. Patient severity (s) affects the medical error rate through two 
potential channels: the abatement effect of physician effort "15 7 %2 6 4)15 and the natural 
error borne with certain procedure that depends on patient's severity (12). Given the 
physician goes forward with vaginal delivery, the medical error rate would increase with 
patient severity (128 3 4), because the surgical procedure would be more medically 
appropriate for patients with certain birth complications. On the contrary, given the 
physician has chosen to perform a C-section, the medical error rate would decrease with 
patient severity (129 6 4). We also assume the strength of abatement effect (effort) is 
always smaller than the natural error associated with each procedure (:12;: < =15 7 %2=) 
because full elimination of medical error through physician effort would be too restrictive 
an assumption. Thus, the perceived tort liability is an increasing function of patient 
severity (i.e. /2 > /15,%2 > /,12 3 4) if vaginal delivery is performed. If C-section is 
performed, the perceived tort liability could be an increasing or decreasing function of 
patient severity depending on the relative magnitude of /2 and 15,%2 ,> /,12. 
 
The physician will determine an optimal level of effort (%?) in treating his/her patient by 
maximizing his utility, where %? is characterized by 
 -5"#$ %?"#$ &'(*$ )* . ,/"#$ &'($ )* 0,15"%?"#$ &'(*$ #$ )* + 4@ ,
Given %?, a physician's indirect utility function of performing a C-section will be 
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!?"#$ &'($ A* + ,-"#$ %?"#$ &'(*$ A* . ,/"#$ &'($ A* 0 ,1"%?"#$ &'(*$ #$ A*@ ,
The indirect utility of a vaginal delivery will be 
 !?"#$ &'($ B* + ,-"#$ %?"#$ &'(*$ B* . ,/"#$ &'($ B* 0 ,1"%?"#$ &'(*$ #$ B*@ ,
The physician chooses to perform a C-section if !?"#$ &'($ A* 3 !?"#$ &'($ B*. 
Otherwise, vaginal delivery occurs. Given that the benefit function is a quadratic form 
and the tort liability would be an increasing or decreasing function in patient severity, we 
assume !?"#$ &'($ A* and !?"#$ &'($ B*, illustrated in Figure 2.2, are also quadratic in 
form.16 
 
We make two further assumptions. First, performing C-section yields higher financial 
and non-financial (time convenience and less effort) returns for physicians especially 
when patients are relatively healthier, so we assume !?"4$ &'($ A* 3 !?"4$ &'($ B* when # + 4. 
 
Relatedly, C-section is more medically appropriate for patients with certain medical 
complications and treating more severe patients provides physician higher intrinsic 
rewards, so we assume !?"C'D$ &'($ A* 3 !?"C'D$ &'($ B* when # + C'D. Second, 
we assume that !?"#$ &'($ A* decreases at a faster rate than does !?"#$ &'($ B* when s is 
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low and !?"#$ &'($ A* increases at a faster rate than does !?"#$ &'($ B* when s is high.17 
Given these assumptions and the curvature of the utility function, there exists #"&'(*E in 
the low severity spectrum (# 6 #) and #"&'(*F in the high severity spectrum (# 3 #) for 
which 
 !?"#"&'(*E$ &'($ A* + !?"#"&'(*E$ &'($ B* !?"#"&'(*F$ &'($ A* + !?"#"&'(*F$ &'($ B* 
 
Thus, in Figure 2.2, when the patient is healthy (i.e. # 6 #"&'(*E), the physician will 
choose to perform C-section due to higher financial returns, time convenience and less 
efforts. When the patient has more severe conditions (i.e. # 3 #"&'(*F), the physician 
will also choose to perform C-section because the procedure is more medically 
appropriate and the physician's intrinsic rewards is aligned with the financial incentives 
in this case. 
 
2.3.2 Physician Effort and Tort Reforms 
Given this model, we have the following propositions. Proofs are in Appendix I. 
 
Proposition 1: The liability-increasing (liability-decreasing) tort reform will 
increase (decrease) a physician's effort level and reduce his/her medical error 
rate. 
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The effect of liability increasing tort reform will increase physician's effort level 
regardless of physician's procedure choice. Nevertheless, the liability increasing tort 
reform will lead to fewer C-section performances as stated in the next proposition. To 
prove the second proposition, two assumptions are made. First, similar to Currie and 
Macleod (2008), we assume that the effect of tort law on tort liability is independent of 
procedure choice, which implies that the tort liability given a medical error has occurred 
if the physician performs a C-section is the same as when the physician performs a 
vaginal delivery, /GHI"#$ &'($ A* + /GHI"#$ &'($ B*. Second, given %?, the medical error 
rate associated with C-section is always higher than the medical error rate associated with 
vaginal delivery, 1"%?$ #$ A* ,. ,1"%?$ #$ B* 3 4. We then have 
 
Proposition 2: The liability-increasing (liability-decreasing) tort reform will 
decrease (increase) physician's C-section performances. 
 
As discussed in Section 2.1, CPD reform reduces the level of liability facing by 
physicians and JSL reform does the opposite. Thus, we expect the CPD reform will 
increase physicians' C-section rates and the JSL reform will decrease physicians' C-
section rates. 
 
As mentioned above, C-section is more medically appropriate for patients with certain 
medical complications, and unnecessary C-section entails higher risks to mothers without 
such medical conditions.18 Therefore, we assume that the difference in medical error rates !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!',!/03!49":39"6!5;9!7;@!M9"1D!40"7<C369"=E!31:6C7"103<!C8!c367:08!T3;273!)-)-!@393d!E"#"=E!C"9:0!6:!E936:39!:06=!;9!3LB67!:;!%(!@33D1!4;>273:3<!E31:6:";=!I5B77M:39>J!@":0!6!1"=E73!C6C8!I1"=E73:;=J!"=!6!
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associated with C-section and vaginal delivery is larger (smaller) when the patient is 
relatively healthier (sicker). That is, 1"%?$ #"&'(*E$ A* ,. ,1"%?$ #"&'(*E$ B* 3,1"%?$ #"&'(*F$ A* ,. ,1"%?$ #"&'(*F$ B*. Finally we have 
 
Proposition 3: The liability-increasing (liability-decreasing) tort reform will 
decrease (increase) physician's C-section performances on healthy patients 
more than on sicker patients. 
 
For some intuition on what this model adds to the literature, consider that the innovation 
brought about by the quadratic utility function is what it reveals about performing C-
section on healthy patients (s is less than the cutoff value #E).  On this end of the 
spectrum altruism effects are unambiguous. Lack of physician altruism would result in 
more C-sections under lower liability pressure because of the financial/non-financial 
benefits. Alternatively altruistic physicians treating a healthy patient with a preference for 
C-section would likely yield to patient wishes with regard to delivery type19. 
 
In a high liability tort environment this altruism (in this case deferring to patient 
preference) would be offset by the increased risk, even if slight, of C-section over vaginal 
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predict an increase in C-section rates even in the altruistic case, because physicians would 
be willing to perform more C-sections. Thus, regardless of physician altruism, lower tort 
liability leads to more C-sections in otherwise healthy patients20. 
 
On the high end of the severity spectrum, a patient in distress, that is with higher s, 
provides an altruistic benefit to a physician with altruistic motives, while at the same time 
reducing a physician's welfare level because more effort is required to go forward with 
vaginal delivery in a clinically complex patient and to reduce the likelihood of medical 
error in such cases. However, at some level of severity, a C-section is unequivocally 
indicated, regardless of the level of altruism. Thus, for patients with # 3 #F, the 
physician will also choose to perform a C-section because her utility rises with patient 
severity and is only reinforced if the physician derives an altruistic benefit from treating 
such patients. 
 
On the other hand, the abatement effect of effort is smaller if the patient is relatively 
healthy. The probability to err on healthy patients with a medically inappropriate 
procedure is larger than on sick patients given the natural error rate is less reduced by the 
smaller effect of patient severity on physician effort level. Assuming uniformly 
distributed liability increase across patient severity, the liability increasing tort reform 
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will largely reduce those medically inappropriate and unnecessary invasive procedures 
(C-sections) on the healthy patients. 
 
2.4 Data and Sample 
Our main source of Pennsylvania and New Jersey tort law information is the American 
Tort Reform Association (ATRA). ATRA does not provide exact tort reform enactment 
dates, so we cross reference to Westlaw, the Summary of US Medical Malpractice Law 
provided on McCullough, Campbell and Lane LLP's website and Database of State Tort 
Law Reforms summarized by Avraham (2010) for detailed information on the tort 
reforms' status in both states. 
 
Our patient level data include hospital inpatient claims records collected by the 
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) and New Jersey Healthcare 
Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) from 1994 to the second quarter of 2006. Both 
datasets include a comprehensive set of hospitalization records, diagnosis and procedure 
codes, and basic patient socio-demographic characteristics.  Specifically these patient 
characteristics include patient age, race and ethnicity (Black, White, Hispanic, and other), 
patient residential zipcode, and insurance type (Medicaid, private insurance, out-of-
pocket payer or other insurance).  The data also include unique hospital identifiers, 
admission type indicator (i.e. urgent, emergent), quarter of admission, and whether the 
admission occurred on a weekend. 
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From the inpatient claim data we select pregnant women aged from 15-45 years, as this is 
widely considered the standard age range for fertility. We exclude patient claims with 
procedure codes for complications that are not intended to result in live birth such as 
removal of extratubal ectopic pregnancy, hysterectomy to terminate pregnancy and intra-
amniotic injection for abortion, as well as patients diagnosed with one of the following 
cases: ectopic and molar pregnancy, pregnancy with abortive outcomes and intrauterine 
death. We also exclude non-singleton birth claims because C-section incidence and birth 
risk are generally higher for multiple births. We also exclude patients residing outside NJ 
and PA. Later in our robustness check, we confirm that these sample selections do not 
affect our results. Our final sample includes 1,400,612 singleton births that occurred in 
Pennsylvania and 1,199,658 singleton births that occurred in New Jersey between 1994 
and the second quarter of 2006. 
 
Table 2.1 presents means of our outcome variables and explanatory variables by the 
states. The cesarean section rate is higher in NJ (27.6%) than in PA (22.1%). Since our 
theory predicts that tort reform will have a larger impact on physician's C-section 
performances on healthy patients, we also run regressions by birth risks measured in 
terms of patients' pre-existing medical conditions and non-preventable birth, patients' age 
and patients' income at their county of residence. Table 2.1 shows that C-section rate is 
higher for mothers with pre-existing medical condition or non-preventable birth 
complications (46.5%), older mothers (29.8%), and mothers residing in wealthier areas 
(25%). With regard to explanatory variables, differences between PA and NJ are limited, 
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but include the proportion of Medicaid versus self-pay (in part due to different Medicaid 
qualification thresholds in each state). 
 
2.5 Empirical Specification 
We employ difference-in-differences method to estimate the effect of a specific tort 
reform on changes in delivery type. We first estimate the effect of CPD and JSL 
separately using the following equation. 
 JK2L + MNOPQOL > MROPQOL 0 ,STK2 > MUVK2L > W2 ,> XK2L                           (5),
 
The dependent variable JK2L is the indicator for C-section for individual i treated by 
physician s in quarter t. OPQOL is equal to one for the periods after CPD (3rd quarter of 
1995) or JSL reform (4th quarter of 1995) in NJ. ST + Y indicates the pregnant women in 
New Jersey. VK2 is a vector that include patient's age, a dummy variable for black, dummy 
variables for admission during weekends and emergency admission, dummy variables for 
insurance status (private insurance and self-pay), and dummies indicating any pre-
existing medical conditions and non-preventable birth complications. Finally, we include 
physician fixed effects W2 to control time-invariant unobserved characteristics of 
physicians. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering by physician. We run the 
regressions using three different samples: pregnant women who were in labor and 
delivery within a quarter, within two quarters and within one year before and after the tort 
reform. 
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Our parameter of interest is MR. For the JSL reform, we expect MR to be negative. On the 
contrary, we expect MR to be positive for the CPD reform. Since the CPD and JSL 
reforms are expected to have opposite effects, we jointly estimate the impacts of these 
reforms based on the following equation. 
 JK2L + ZNT[\L > ZRAJ]L > ZUT[\L 0 ,STK2 > Z^AJ]L 0 ,STK2 > Z_VK2L > W2 > XK2L      
(6),
Since CPD and JSL were enacted in adjacent quarters, our samples include pregnant 
women who were in labor and delivery within a quarter, two quarters and one year before 
the CPD and after the JSL. We expect ZU to be negative and Z^ to be positive. 
 
We use the subsequent tort reforms in Pennsylvania for a “reverse experiment”. Since 
JSL and CPD remained active in NJ when PA modified its CPD (January 1997) and JSL 
(June 2002), the DD estimates allow us to identify the effect of “removal of tort reforms”. 
Specifically, we estimate the following equation using NJ as the comparison group. 
 JK2L + MNSPOPQOL > MRSPOPQOL 0 ,J`K2 > MUVK2L > W2 > XK2L                      (7),
 SPOPQOL is equal to 1 for the periods before the reform in Pennsylvania. PA is equal to 
1 for pregnant women in Pennsylvania. Because the DD estimate captures the effect of 
having no reform in PA, we expect MR to be positive for having no JSL reform, and MR to 
be negative for having no CPD reform. 
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There are two advantages of estimating equation (7). First, technically we can estimate 
equation (5) by replacing NJ dummy with PA dummy. However, it makes a stronger 
assumption that PA experienced the same common trend as NJ, the state that already 
passed the CPD and JSL. It is more legitimate to assume that PA and NJ experienced the 
same common trend if they have the same tort status before any law change. Second, it 
also avoids the endogeneity of “turning off” tort reforms. Physicians will have an 
incentive to change their behaviors before the “removal” because they will be subject to 
the new law even if the tort occurred under the old regime. Thus, Currie and MacLeod 
(2008) find insignificant effects if tort reforms are removed. As a reversed experiment, 
our estimates serve as a robustness check on the effect of enacting tort reforms. 
 
2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Basic DD Results 
Table 2.2 shows the individual effects of CPD and JSL reforms in New Jersey. We test 
the effects of reforms within different lengths of time around the quarter in which the 
reform is enacted: +/- one quarter, half year and one year. 
 
As reported in Panel A, enacting CPD in New Jersey increases C-section incidence by 
0.011 percentage point in the shortest interval. This is similar to the results found in 
Currie and MacLeod (2008). Looking at longer time periods around the addition of CPD 
leads to smaller and less precisely estimated effects on C-section. While this might draw 
into question the initial empirical result, keep in mind that JSL reform in New Jersey 
occurs within 2 quarters of CPD reform, and is predicted to have a countervailing effect. 
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We will discuss this more in our joint estimation in Panel C. Results in Panel B reveal 
consistent story with our expectation of JSL reform, which increases the liability of the 
physician in the event of a suit. Enacted two quarters prior to CPD reform in New Jersey, 
JSL reform lead to a 0.0126 percentage point decline in C-section. Again, the diminishing 
effect of JSL could be due to the conflicting effect of CPD. 
 
In Panel C, we show the joint effects of CPD and JSL reforms enacted in NJ in 1995. The 
effects of CPD and JSL on C-section rate are opposite as predicted by our theory. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the effects of both CPD and JSL persist over a long 
period of time on C-section choice. In a year after the reforms were enacted, the JSL 
reform led to a 0.012 percentage point decrease and the CPD reform led to a 0.011 
percentage point increase in the C-section rate. The effects of CPD and JSL nearly 
cancelled out one another. These results suggest the importance to separate the effect of 
each individual tort reform. The overall effect of tort reforms is masked by heterogeneous 
effects of different reforms. 
 
We investigate the robustness of the preceding results in Panel C to a number of 
alternative specifications as reported in Table 2.3. Overall the results were very robust. 
To conserve space, we only report the estimates +/- one quarter. The first set of 
sensitivity analyses uses alternative sources of within variation to identify the effect of 
tort reform on C-section incidence. Hospital fixed-effect models in which the standard 
errors are clustered by hospital (column 2) and county fixed-effect models in which the 
standard errors are clustered by county (column 3) yield very similar results as our 
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previous physician fixed-effect models. The second set of sensitivity analyses (columns 4 
and 5) use different sample selection criteria. Our results do not appear to be driven by 
the sample inclusion criteria. 
 
2.6.2 Results from Reverse Experiments 
Using New Jersey as a natural control state, the reverse experiment in Pennsylvania leads 
to a different conclusion in the case of CPD. The coefficients in Panel A of Table 2.4 are 
insignificant and mostly positive. It implies that the C-section rate was higher before 
CPD reform in PA and CPD reform literally reduced the C-section rate, a finding that is 
inconsistent with our theory. As discussed in Section 2.1, the results on CPD in PA need 
to be interpreted with caution, because the CPD reform in PA lacked in its strength of 
constitutionality. 
 
Driven by bar owners and restaurants entrepreneurs trying to reduce the number of drunk 
driving torts they faced, PA JSL reform is also applicable to medical malpractice, which 
holds the physicians more liable to the medical torts. The positive coefficient in Panel B 
represents that the absence of JSL reform results in a higher C-section rate in PA, which 
is equivalent to the statement that enacting JSL reform in Pennsylvania decreases C-
section by 0.0081 percentage point. However the effect of JSL reform on C-section 
vanished over longer periods of time. As been discussed previously, the ongoing medical 
malpractice crisis in Pennsylvania during late 90s contaminated the effect of JSL reform 
with the passage of MCARE act in early 2002. The MCARE act seeks to lower medical 
malpractice risk experienced by physicians, an opposite effect to the JSL reform. In Panel 
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C, controlling the effects of MCARE, the effects of no JSL reform are all positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that the JSL reform in PA reduced the C-section rates. 
 
Overall, the results in NJ and PA are consistent with our theoretical prediction that the 
JSL reform (liability-increasing reform) reduces the C-section rates, while the CPD 
reform (liability-decreasing reform) increases the C-section rates. Nevertheless, the 
effects are relatively small. Tort reform changed, either increase or decrease, C-section 
rates by 2%-4% in a year after the reform. Putting JSL and CPD reforms together, the 
effects are almost cancelled out each other, suggesting no effect of tort reform overall. 
 
2.6.3 Effects by Patients’ Health 
Our theoretical model predicts that the effects of tort reforms will be concentrated among 
the relatively healthy patients because the medical error rate on C-section without 
medical indication in healthy patients is higher than it would be in having them undergo 
vaginal delivery. Table 2.5 summarizes the effects of tort reforms in NJ on C-section use 
among different patient groups. 
 
We use three characteristics to proxy patient's relative health status: (1) whether the 
patient has any pre-existing medical condition (risky vs. safe pregnancy); (2) young 
patients between 15-30 years old (young vs. old); (3) whether the patient lives in high-
income area. 
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In columns (1) and (2), we estimate the effects of tort reforms specifically on patients 
with and without any pre-existing medical conditions and any non-preventable 
complication upon admission.21 Consistent with our theoretical model, the effects of tort 
reform are concentrated among patients without any reported pre-existing medical 
conditions or any non-preventable complication. The physician is more likely to change 
his/her behavior on the margin given changes in the tort liability. 
 
The estimates in columns (3) and (4) suggest that younger patients (aged group 15-30) 
are more affected by the tort reform than older mothers (30+). It has been universally 
recognized that age plays an important factor in evaluating the birth risk.  An older 
mother has a higher chance to suffer from age or other factors related to age, whether she 
is an 'elderly primagravida' or who is giving birth to the fifth or sixth child and thus likely 
older in age.22 The change of liability risk affects physicians to change the practice 
patterns on young patients only. 
 
Last, we separate the patients by their residence zipcode income level in each state.23 
Patients residing in higher or equal to state median income are usually wealthier and have 
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higher education level, and thus more likely to have better prenatal care as well as more 
responsive to information regarding medical treatment and tort law change.  These 
women may also be more likely to have developed preferences for the mode of delivery 
(Price and Simon 2009). The physicians are more likely to change their behavior in the 
area where the median income is higher, as suggested in columns (7) and (8).  This 
suggests some of the effect of lowering tort pressure is potentially operating through 
physician altruism via being willing to yield to patient autonomy in lower tort 
environments. 
In a lower tort liability environment, the physicians are more likely to give patient more 
autonomy before their due date to select a C-section. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Our theoretical model indicates that a physician adjusts her procedure use according to 
change in her tort liability that is created by various exogenous tort reforms. This model 
disentangles the various incentives facing physicians during her medical decision making 
process. Aside from the malpractice liability pressures, we model the physician's choice 
is also affected by her altruistic characteristics to treat severe patients and non-altruistic 
characteristics to treat healthier patients. Allowing for the variations in patient conditions 
and physician effort level, we predict the tort reforms may affect the procedure choice 
differently, and the effects are concentrated in relatively healthy patients. 
 
We examine the effect of specific tort reform (CPD and JSL reform) on the procedure 
choice in the area of obstetrics using state level inpatient claim datasets, which cover 
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almost all the birth cases in both states. Consistent with our theoretical model, we find 
evidence that JSL reform reduces invasive and risky procedure by increasing physician's 
liability. We observe a significant reduction in C-sections. Conversely, CPD reduces both 
hospital and physician's malpractice liability by directly limiting patient's incentives to 
sue.  Therefore the joint decision to have a C-section would be favored by physicians and 
hospitals due to financial and non-financial incentives (time convenience). Overall 
enacting CPD results in more C-sections. 
 
The overall effects of tort reform on procedure choice are rather small considering the 
mean rates of C-section over the period are in excess of 20%. Our model is more flexible 
in that it allows us to examine effects along the spectrum of patient health.  In this model 
the expansion of C-section utilization in lower tort liability environments is predicted to 
occur in healthy women. This is because obstetricians respond to either or both patient 
autonomy and their own financial and convenience incentives and perform more C-
sections on healthy patients in response to lower liability exposure. 
 
Previous models examining obstetrics practice have largely considered the financial 
incentives physicians have to do C-sections (Gruber 1999).  Our model and empirical 
results are also potentially consistent with a story of patient autonomy, wherein low 
liability exposure legal environments obstetricians are more willing to defer to a patient's 
desire to undergo planned C-section for reasons other than medical need. Under the 
assumption that there are more women who would prefer elective C-section than are 
getting it due to tort concerns, autonomy and financial incentives are both working to 
%.!!
move use rates in the same direction in the event of liability decreasing reform. This is 
also consistent with Blomqvist (1991) physician agent model, where the legal 
environment serves to affect who the physician acts as an agent for (insurer or patient) 
and would predict the changes we observe. While our empirical investigation of this point 
is limited by the data, this point is salient to discussions surrounding the tension around 
patient choice and costs of care and should be investigated further. Our results suggest 
the incidence of C-section among the less healthy patients are unaffected by tort reform, 
indicating C-sections in this group may be driven entirely by medical need. 
 
There are also limitations in our study. First, we do not fully observe patient's 
heterogeneity in terms of their education or health behaviors such as smoking and 
drinking during pregnancy. Second, because HCUP-NJ data do not assign personal 
identifier for each individual's hospitalization records; we are not able to track patients 
over time to fully identify the changes in patients' utilization of preventative treatment 
prior to delivery. Third, the data do not provide information with respect to physician's 
education, experience and malpractice claims, which might impact their personal practice 
pattern. Also we do not address existence of negative defensive medicine.24 Tort reform 
could influence the labor supply decision of physicians in a heterogeneous manner, as 
well as the potential to select patients. However, we are examining a relatively short 
period around each reform, and the labor supply is likely slower to respond. 
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Further study of the impacts of tort reform on medical practice needs to focus on the 
intersection of physician's behavior and patient autonomy. In addition, our research 
points out the need for understanding the dynamics of the tort environment. As Currie 
and Macleod (2008) touch on in their work, the tort reform database has many errors 
regarding the status of the reforms, and sometimes practices could already be covered 
under common law. 
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Table 2.2 Effects of Tort Reforms on C-section Utilization in New Jersey 
Variables +/-1 Quarter +/-2 Quarter +/-1 Year 
Panel A: Effect of CPD in NJ (enacted in Oct. 1995) 
CPD ON 0.0110** 0.0049 0.0024 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
R-squared 0.441 0.437 0.432 
Observations 100,658 204,660 412,954 
Panel B: Effect of JSL reform in NJ (enacted in Jun. 1995) 
JSL ON -0.0126*** -0.0064** -0.0051* 
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
R-squared 0.444 0.440 0.436 
Observations 103,579 198,858 406,262 
Panel C: Joint Estimation of the Effect on C-sections 
JSL ON -0.0125*** -0.0117*** -0.0122*** 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
CPD ON 0.0116*** 0.0106*** 0.0113*** 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
R-squared 0.442 0.437 0.434 
Observations 151,049 252,469 464,719 
All columns control for physician fixed effect. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered by 
physician. Other control variables in all regressions include age, black, self pay, medicaid, previous c-
section, emergency admission, admission at weekend, non-preventable birth complications and pre-existing 
medical conditions.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.4 Effects of Tort Reforms on C-section Utilization in Pennsylvania – “Reverse 
Experiment” 
Variables +/-1 Quarter +/-2 Quarter +/-1 Year 
 Panel A: Effect of CPD in PA (enacted in Jan. 1997) CPD OFF 0.0063 0.0040 0.0037* 
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002] 
R-squared 0.422 0.420 0.420 
Observations 106,542 217,465 434,725 
 Panel B: Effect of JSL reform in PA (enacted in Mar. 2002) JSL OFF 0.0081* 0.0034 0.0017 
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002] 
Observations 0.441 0.442 0.439 
R-squared 106,437 217,183 437,152 
 Panel C: Joint Estimation of the Effect on C-sections JSL OFF 0.0084** 0.0083** 0.0067** 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
MCARE 0.0095** 0.0085** 0.0056* 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
R-squared 0.443 0.441 0.436 
Observations 159,329 274,905 490,894 
All columns control for physician fixed effect. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered by 
physician. Other control variables in all regressions include age, black, self pay, medicaid, previous c-
section, emergency admission, admission at weekend, non-preventable birth complications and pre-existing 
medical conditions.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2.2 – Physician Utility Level with respect to Patient Severity upon Admission 
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2.9 APPENDIX.  Mathematical Proof of Proposition 
2.9.1 Proposition 1. 
 
Differentiating equation (2) with respect to law, -55,%GHI? .,/GHI15 . ,/155,%GHI? + 4 %GHI? + /GHI15-55,a 155/ + /GHI15!55 ,
From the second-order condition, !55 6 4. Together with 15 6 4,  #bcde%GHI? f ,+ ,#bcde/GHIf@,
 
2.9.2 Proposition 2. 
 
Differentiating equations (3) and (4) with respect to law,  
!2?"#"&'(*g,$ A$ &'(*h#"&'(*gh&'( ,> !GHI? ,"#"&'(*g$ A$ &'(* 
+ !2?"#"&'(*g,$ B$ &'(* h#"&'(*gh&'( ,> !GHI? ,"#"&'(*g$ B$ &'(*,,
where i, + ,\$ /.  !GHI? ,"#"&'(*g$ )$ &'(* ,+ ,-5%GHI? . /GHI,1"%?$ #$ )* . /15%GHI? ,,+ "-5 . /15*%GHI? . /GHI1"%?$ #$ )* 
Given equation (2), -5 . /15 + 4,we can write  !GHI? ,"#"&'(*g$ )$ &'(* + ./GHI"#$ &'($ )*1"%?$ #$ )*@,
*'!!
e!2?"#"&'(*g$ A$ &'(* . !2?"#"&'(*g$ B$ &'(*f h#"&'(*gh&'( ,+ ,!GHI? ,"#"&'(*g,$ B$ &'(* . !GHI? ,"#"&'(*g,$ A$ &'(*,+ ,/GHI"#$ A$ &'(*1"%?$ #$ A* . /GHI"#$ B$ &'(*1"%?$ #$ B*,
Suppose /GHI"#$ A$ &'(* ,+ ,/GHI"#$ B$ &'(* ,+ ,/GHI,  h#"&'(*gh&'( ,+ 1"%?$ #$ A* . 1"%?$ #$ B*jk?"l"mno*p$ q$ mno*,a,jk?"l"mno*p$ r$ mno*/&'(,
Suppose 1"%?$ #$ A* . 1"%?$ #$ B* 3 4. When # + #"&'(*E, !2?"#"&'(*E$ A$ &'(*,a,!2?"#"&'(*E$ B$ &'(* ,6 ,4@,
#bcdeh#"&'(*Eh&'( ,f ,+ ,.#bcde/GHIf,
When #, + , #"&'(*F, !2?"#"&'(*F$ A$ &'(*,a,!2?"#"&'(*F$ B$ &'(* ,3 ,4. 
#bcdeh#"&'(*Fh&'( ,f ,+ ,#bcde/GHIf, 
 
2.10 Proposition 3. 
 
Suppose  =!2?"#"&'(*E$ A$ &'(*,a,!2?"#"&'(*E$ B$ &'(*= ,s , =!2?"#"&'(*F$ A$ &'(*,a,!2?"#"&'(*F$ B$ &'(*$,
Because 
 e1"%?$ #"&'(*E$ A* . 1"%?$ #"&'(*E$ B*f ,3 , e1"%?$ #"&'(*F$ A* . 1"%?$ #"&'(*F$ B*f, 
= h#"&'(*Eh&'( ,= ,3 , = h#"&'(*Fh&'( ,=,
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3 Medical Malpractice Lawsuits as Bad Signals: Does the Fear of being Sued 
Encourage Better Quality of Care? 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the late 1990s, a nationwide crisis of “availability and affordability” of malpractice 
insurance has generated great research interest in whether and how suing healthcare 
providers for negligence or wrongdoings alters treatment decisions and intensity, which 
indirectly increase the cost of healthcare. Less attention, however, has been paid to the 
potential quality signals that medical malpractice lawsuits and jury verdicts provide about 
hospitals that are sued together with physicians (Morlock and Malitz, 1991). Given the 
information asymmetry in healthcare markets, consumers (patients) could potentially 
view medical malpractice and jury verdicts (on proven guilty) as a signal of bad quality 
of overall hospital services, and these patients might avoid hospitals that are frequently 
involved in medical malpractice lawsuits. If medical malpractice lawsuits increase market 
quality elasticity, and therefore reduce the monopoly power of hospitals in a local market, 
the question is whether the fear of being sued and losing in medical malpractice lawsuits 
drives hospitals to compete over quality. 
 
This chapter investigates how the likelihood of being labeled with bad quality by medical 
malpractice lawsuits changes the nature of hospital competition in Pennsylvania and 
whether hospital competition in markets where likelihood to be named in malpractice 
lawsuits will have impact on the quality of services provided to patients who are covered 
by private insurance in one of the more frequently sued practices, obstetrics.  
 
*+!!
The effect of hospital competition on quality provided to privately insured patients 
remains an open empirical question. In theory, hospitals can both compete over quality 
and price among patients with private insurance; therefore whether hospital competition 
improves quality depends on the relative magnitude of hospital competition over quality 
and price. The empirical findings on the effect of hospital competition on quality also 
vary greatly. Many current studies focus on more severe patient conditions, such as 
Ischemic Heart Diseases, AMI, and pneumonia, and often draw different conclusions and 
implications of hospital competition (Kessler and McClellan 2000; Ho and Hamilton 
2000; Gowrisankaran and Town 2003; Mukamel, Zwanziger and Bamezai 2002; Shen 
2003; Sohn and Rathouz 2003; Tay 2003; Propper, Burgess and Green 2004; Kessler and 
Geppert 2005). 
 
While the economic theory is clear when it comes to patients who are publicly insured 
(such as participants of Medicaid and Medicare), the effect of hospital competition on 
quality provision can be ambiguous when the firms (hospitals) set the price and quality 
simultaneously25 as is the case with private insurance. Economic theory points out that 
the effect of competition on quality depends on the changes in the price and quality 
elasticities of the market for privately insured patients. On the one hand, it predicts that 
hospital competition may reduce medical treatment if hospitals compete heavily on price 
and therefore decreasing profit margins may adversely affect health outcomes (Encinosa 
and Bernard, 2005). On the other hand, hospital competition may also improve the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 The effect of hospital competition among Medicaid patients (fixed price) on quality is 
unambiguous: quality improves as long as the price margin (decreasing with increasing 
competition) is non-negative (Gaynor 2005). 
**!!
quality of care if public information about quality serves as an incentive for hospitals to 
compete along the quality dimension (Dranove and Satterthwaite 1992).  
 
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, unlike others, this study 
focuses on one of the largest hospital practices, obstetrics, which is also highly influenced 
by the nationwide medical malpractice crisis (2001-present) in the United States between 
1995 and 2005. Second, to measure market competition, this paper uses the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (or HHI), which is predicted by a discrete choice model, separately for 
each insurance type, using information about distance, hospital characteristics, patient 
characteristics, particularly patient medical conditions and childbirth characteristics (such 
as having previous C-sections or not) that are observable prior to delivery, and factors 
that determine patient hospital choice. Third, this paper is the first in the literature to 
study the impact of quality information revealed by lawsuits for medical malpractice on 
the effect of hospital competition for privately insured patients.  
 
Overall, I find that hospital competition improves quality. Hospitals in more competitive 
markets use resources more efficiently and provide better care. They also have greater 
incentives to encourage physicians to perform more C-sections, but the empirical 
evidence suggests that hospital competition increases C-sections only among patients 
who exhibit certain medical conditions that may complicate birth delivery. Because 
medical malpractice lawsuits could potentially indicate that the hospital (or its associated 
physicians) being sued was of poor quality, and the number and size of jury verdicts 
suggest the likelihood of being sued, hospitals located in markets where negative jury 
*.!!
verdicts are both larger and more frequent may have a stronger incentive to improve their 
quality (compared to hospitals in markets where negative jury verdicts are less likely). If 
hospitals compete with each other, such stronger incentive may also encourage hospitals 
to compete more heavily by providing better care.  
 
Specifically, I examine the effect of hospital competition on procedure choice, health 
outcomes and hospital resource use both before and after the enactment of Medical Care 
Affordability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act in 2002. I find that the likelihood of 
being involved in malpractice lawsuits affects hospital competition, plausibly because 
information about bad quality could be conveyed to the market by the lawsuits. This 
finding is particularly interesting because it provides insight into the potential directions 
for current tort reform debates on the reduction of medical malpractice cost.  
 
MCARE Act included a comprehensive set of medical malpractice liability reforms and 
was enacted in 2002 to deal with the ongoing medical malpractice crisis in Pennsylvania. 
Several steps were taken to reduce healthcare providers’ medical malpractice liability by 
making filing a lawsuit more difficult and by providing public medical malpractice 
insurance against unusually large damage awards. MCARE also aims to improve patient 
safety and to reduce medical errors by using stricter guidelines for reporting medical 
errors and by creating a state agent, Patient Safety Authority26, to collect information on 
existing medical errors.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!).!S;9!<3:6"71!;=!:03!T6:"3=:![653:8!KB:0;9":8?!273613!93539!:;!":1!@3C1":3d!0::2dbb26:"3=:1653:86B:0;9":8$;9EbT6E31bF356B7:$612N!
*(!!
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II reviews institutional 
background including the literature on the effects of hospital competition on obstetrics, 
and the effect of medical malpractice liability on hospital competition.  Section III 
presents a conceptual framework. Section IV discusses the calculation of HHI. Section V 
explains the sample selection process. Section VI presents the empirical model and 
Section VII discusses the results. Section VIII concludes.  
 
3.2 Institutional Background  
3.2.1 Literature on hospital competition  
Although the “Structure-Conduct-Performance” approach to studying the effect of 
competition on quality has been popular, it suffers from the endogeneity of the measures 
of market competitiveness27 (Kessler and McClellan 2000; Gowrisankaran and Town 
2003; Tay 2003; Gaynor 2005).  One example of the endogeneity is that hospitals in a 
more competitive market tend to attract sicker patients, which may negatively impact the 
overall quality of health care provided by the hospitals in that area when patient severity 
is not adjusted for. 
 
When a firm sets its own price (in the absence of perfect competition), theory indicates 
that the effect of competition depends on the relative change of the elasticity of quality 
and the elasticity of price, with the cost of quality held constant. A number of studies that 
find a positive impact from competition have argued that more competitive markets !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Another important issue is whether the competition across different payers (main government 
payers and private insurers) are separable. Most studies focusing on Medicaid and Medicare 
implicitly assume the demand and cost of those two types of markets are separable. 
*,!!
usually have higher quality elasticity (Sari 2002). Using Los Angeles county secondary 
discharge data, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) find that risk-adjusted mortality for 
HMO acute myocardial infarction and pneumonia patients is significantly lower in more 
competitive markets, which implies that competition could be quality increasing. Sohn 
and Rathouz (2003) also study patients receiving percutaneous transluminal coronary 
angioplasty (PTCA) surgery in California and find that mortality is lower for patients in 
hospitals facing more competition.  
 
One counterargument to the quality enhancing effect of competition is that competition 
may reduce quality because it may reduce hospital profit margin.  This profit trimming 
effect of competition is especially of concern when it comes to the current payer-driven 
competition. Encinosa and Bernard (2005) examine the impact of hospital financial 
pressure on patient safety. They find higher incidence of adverse safety events among 
financially stressed hospitals, which implies that competition that reduces hospital profit 
margin could have negative impact on patient health outcomes. Mukamel, Zwanziger and 
Bamezai (2002) find that the introduction of selective contracting leads to more price 
competition, lower clinical expenditures and higher mortality. Consistent with Dorfman 
and Steiner’s model (1954), they suggest that selective contracting has increased the price 
elasticity of demand face by hospitals more than the quality elasticity that leads to a 
decline in quality. Outside the U.S. setting, Propper, Burgess and Green (2004) find that 
mortality increases with the number of competitors in the United Kingdom.  
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3.2.2 Hospital Competition in Obstetrics  
C-sections have both greater financial returns and more non-financial conveniences for 
physicians and patients than vaginal delivery. There are several reasons why opting for a 
C-section, especially a planned C-section, is preferred by hospitals. First, the prevalent C-
section rate (30% in 2007) nationwide in the modern health care reveals that the public is 
more tolerant than ever to such a major surgical procedure. This is partially because the 
public is unaware of the potential harms of C-sections28. Second, vaginal delivery takes 
much more time for caregivers and requires using the birth room longer. Third, equipped 
with the advanced modern technology in birth delivery (such as labor induction, 
continuous electronic fetal monitoring), physicians and hospitals often prefer not to offer 
patients informed choice of vaginal birth especially for mothers with certain medical 
conditions because they fear medical malpractice lawsuits. Finally, aside for the greater 
reimbursements to physicians and hospitals that accompanies C-sections, organizing and 
utilizing hospital resources (such as birth rooms, device use, physician and staff work 
schedule) is easier in C-sections than when women undergo trial-of-labor (TOL), and this 
is especially true for planned C-sections.  
 
3.2.3 Hospital Medical Malpractice Liability in Pennsylvania 
As long as negligence occurs within a hospital, the victim may be able to sue the hospital 
and the physician jointly. In some cases, a hospital can be charged when any physician or 
any nurse who is an employee of the hospital commits negligence. In general medical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 In the previous chapter, I  discussed a list of potential harms that could occur with C-section. 
For more detailed information, please refer to the article on Childbirth Connection’s Website: 
http://www.childbirthconnection.org/article.asp?ck=10456. 
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malpractice lawsuits (in obstetrics) against hospitals are often brought up for their 
employees’ failure to monitor fetal heart rates, to provide standard medical assistance,29 
or to advise obstetricians of medical status, which may result in a delay in performing an 
emergency C-section. Historically, hospitals in Pennsylvania were also sued for 
mismanagement of labor and improper discharge from the hospital. When the physicians 
are employed by a hospital, the hospital is often involved in the medical malpractice 
lawsuits when the physicians deviate from the standard of care and harm the patients and 
their infants.  
 
The MCARE of 2002 in Pennsylvania also officially adds ostensible liability as a 
grounds for medical malpractice lawsuits, so that the hospital can be charged with 
ostensible liability if a reasonable person would believe that the physician was an agent 
of the hospital and if the care the victim received was represented as being provided by 
the hospital or an agent of the hospital.30 Further, conventional corporate liability 
sometimes also applies to medical malpractice. In one case involving birth delivery in a 
hospital by a midwife who was not an employee of the hospital but was retained by the 
patient’s HMO, the plaintiff sued the hospital for “failure to have a protocol in place 
requiring the midwife to obtain an obstetrician when labor complications were 
encountered and that the hospital failed to enforce applicable standards or to oversee the 
care of the patients” on the grounds of conventional corporate liability theory that the 
defendant hospital was responsible for the care rendered to its patients whether or not 
such care was rendered by a hospital employee.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Webster vs. Lower Bucks Hospital, et al. Case no. 0503038-12-2; Judge Clyde W. Waite, 07-
19-11. 
30 Statutes before MCARE are similar. 
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Hospitals are frequently sued. One study on Maryland hospital medical malpractice claim 
experience by Morlock and Malitz (1991) shows that hospitals are sued in 72% of the 
claims (10% as the only defendant and 62% as one of multiple defendants) for events that 
occurred within the hospital.31  
 
Hospitals are frequently involved in medical malpractice lawsuits probably because of 
the “deep pocket rule”, or the joint and several liability (JSL) rule, both of which expose 
hospitals to greater medical malpractice liability because hospitals usually are financially 
more capable (or even lucrative from the perspective of plaintiff lawyers) of paying for 
medical malpractice damages, compared to other tortfeasors (physicians and nurses). 
Under the conventional JSL rule, once a verdict is ordered, the named hospital has to 
cover the whole award if the hospital is proven to be more capable of paying even if it is 
only 10% liable for the adverse event, at a cost of dramatic increases in its medical 
malpractice insurance premiums and thinning profit margin. This practice is known as the 
“deep pocket rule”. 
 
JSL reform bans the application of the “deep pocket rule” unless the tortfeasor is 60% 
liable for the medical malpractice. While JSL reform has proven to significantly affect 
physician behavior (Currie and MacLeod 2008), it actually also incentivizes hospitals to 
provide a higher level of care. If the adverse incidences are highly correlated with lower 
quality of care, improving care standards within the hospital may reduce its medical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Particularly in labor-delivery lawsuits, hospitals are the only defendant in 4% of the claims and 
one of the multiple defendants in 69% of the claims.  
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malpractice liability, because the threshold to be fully responsible for the damages award 
is raised to 60%. That being said, the JSL reform introduces greater potential 
opportunities for hospitals to use the increase in quality of care as evidence against 
negligence and avoid liability.  
 
Overall, losing a medical malpractice lawsuit may affect hospital behavior in two ways. 
First, the direct effect is the costs to realize court ordered payout and associated 
administrative expenses, both of which affect hospital profit margins. However, the direct 
impact of medical malpractice liability costs is small32 because almost all hospitals are 
covered by state and commercial insurance, which covers the majority of the payouts. 
Although this leaves defendant hospitals with higher medical malpractice insurance 
premiums in the future,33 much of the increase in medical malpractice insurance premium 
rates is determined by the overall market and the clinical services offered such as 
community-specialty based rating (Mello, 2006).  
 
Second, being sued or losing a medical malpractice lawsuit could damage the defendant 
hospital’s reputation and thus could affect the defendant hospital’s future demand. 
Similar to the impact of bad report card ratings for hospitals, medical malpractice 
lawsuits, especially those with large size verdicts, are usually widely broadcast in the 
news, on the Internet, and via other media. More interestingly, medical malpractice 
claims against defendant hospitals may signal poor quality of overall hospital services, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Medical malpractice liability counts for 2.67% of hospital’s medical service revenue 
(http://www.phc4.org/reports/researchbriefs/050205/nr050205.htm). 
33 Until 2006 there is only about 25% of hospital medical malpractice insurance that is experience 
rated in Pennsylvania. 
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where negligence could be interpreted as lack of care to the patients or inadequate 
management of safety protocols. In markets where hospitals are more likely to suffer 
from reputation damages (frequently sued and higher medical malpractice verdicts are 
ordered), it may be reasonable to assume that hospitals care about quality, balancing 
between potential loss of consumers and higher costs of providing appropriate level of 
care (as well as risk management).  
 
One concern for defendants in medical malpractice lawsuits is that plaintiff lawyers are 
likely to venue shop. The plaintiff lawyers could file their medical malpractice claims in 
any county where any of the defendants is conducting business in an attempt to shop for 
friendlier courts, where they may have better chance to win the lawsuits and extract 
higher compensation. Prior to March 2002, the plaintiffs were able to choose where to 
file suit, especially when multiple defendants were involved.34 However, venue shopping 
is a smaller concern in this study because of the nature of obstetrics. Most of the patients 
received obstetric services near their home residence (prenatal care, physician visits, and 
antenatal care) and do not travel long distances to deliver because of the uncertainty 
between the time of contraction and delivery. Therefore the full advantage of venue 
shopping is limited because of the geographical limits of obstetric services. Although this 
does not completely rule out the possibility of cross-county deliveries (where patients 
may be living on the border of a jury-friendly county and received delivery-related care 
in that county, which significantly reduces the transaction costs of venue shopping), I will 
include those border counties as jury-friendly counties to conduct a robustness check.        !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 This also explains the small proportion of medical malpractice claims filed against hospitals 
only in Morlock and Malitz (1991). 
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3.3 Conceptual Framework 
Theory used previously on airline companies shows that price and quality are determined 
simultaneously when firms set prices; however, in the theory of the effect of hospital 
competition on the quality of services provided to patients covered by private insurance, 
models relying on different assumptions give different predictions (Spence 1975; Shaked 
and Sutton 1983; Motta 1993). Whether hospital competition among privately insured 
patients will improve quality or not is an empirical question.  
 
Among economic models on the quality effect of hospital competition, Dorfman and 
Steiner’s (1954) model on a monopolist’s choice of price and advertising provides some 
insight into the effect of competition in the monopolistically competitive hospital 
markets. Considering a monopolist’s demand could be approximated as a residual 
demand facing a monopolistically competitive firm (Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000), 
the Dorfman and Steiner (DS) condition indicates that the optimal quality when the firm 
sets its prices is a function of price ()), cost of quality (h), and the ratio of quality 
elasticity (Xt) (z indicates quality) and price elasticity of demand (X;):  u + )h 0 XtX;@ 
Its implication on whether competition will increase or decrease the hospital quality, 
where quality depends on the relative changes in both quality and price elasticity of 
demand, is unclear. Having more competitors in a hospital market means a patient has 
more options from which to choose her caregivers based on her preferences for the price 
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and quality a hospital offers. In other words, by giving the patients more options, 
competition may increase both quality elasticity and price elasticity of demand in hospital 
markets. As discussed in the previous section, medical malpractice lawsuits may reduce 
hospital profit margins, which may encourage hospital price competition and may also 
send signals of bad quality to the market, where hospitals could gain more customers by 
offering higher quality of care and steer away from being frequently involved in 
malpractice lawsuits.  
 
3.4 HHI Calculation 
To deal with the endogeneity of the market competitiveness measures in the conventional 
regression analysis of the quality “Structure-Conduct-Performance,” this paper adopts a 
similar strategy as that used by Kessler and McClellan (2000), calculating the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) using weighted hospital shares predicted by a discrete choice 
model of individual patients. In this discrete choice model, the distance to each hospital 
that is in a patient’s choice set is a key variable. As an extension to Kessler and 
McClellan’s model, I estimate patient’s preference with respect to distance first among 
Fee-for-Service patients, and then apply the estimates coefficients to all the private 
insured patients to calculate predicted probabilities for each individual patient to choose a 
hospital within her choice set. Assuming patients covered by private insurance behave 
similarly in choosing her hospital, this HHI is not subject to provider network constraints 
in some private insurance.   
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This method uses two steps to construct HHIs at the zipcode level. In the first step, an 
individual-hospital-insurance specific probability is estimated using a conditional logit 
model in which a patient having a certain Fee-for-Service insurance (private insurance 
including Blue Cross and other commercial insurance) is assumed to choose any hospital 
within 25-miles35. The neighborhood is constructed based on the distance between two 
zip codes – one for the patient’s home residence and the other for the hospital. In the 
second step, I sum up the predicted probabilities by hospital and by zipcode to get HHIs 
at zipcode level.  
 
The reason to use only Fee-for-Service (FFS or indemnity plan) patients in the 
conditional logit estimation for each insurance type is that those patients are least limited 
to the insurance networks that are popularly used in HMO, PPO, or others, which 
validates the method’s assumption that distance to hospital is essential in a patient’s 
choice for his or her hospital. Assuming the patients with the same type of insurance will 
have similar preferences in choosing her hospitals, I then use all the coefficient estimates 
in the conditional logit model of each insurance FFS type to predict each hospital’s share 
of all the patients living in a patient’s zip code for each insurance separately, and the 
overall individual-hospital specific probabilities are summed across the entire market.  
 
There are three steps to compute the market level HHIs for each insurance type. First, I 
aggregate the predicted demand for each hospital by the zip code of each patient’s home 
residence; second, the zip code-level predicted HHI is aggregated by hospital; finally, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 The 25-mile radius includes at least 90% patients for any hospital, and in the sample the 
patients on average travels less than 10 miles to the admitting hospital. 
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hospital specific HHI is aggregated and weighted to the zipcode using the estimated 
probability of a hospital being chosen by those living in the patient’s residential zip code.  
 
Therefore, the predicted HHIs will capture three types of variations. First, there are 
variations in the size of hospital markets through hospital openings, closures and 
mergers; second, variations in HHIs could also result from changes in a potential 
patient’s decision to attend a hospital based on her distance to the hospital;36 third, 
changes in the population distribution may also change the predicted HHIs.  
 
3.5 Empirical Specifications 
3.5.1 Empirical Model 
The hypotheses that I will test are whether hospital competition affects: (1) procedure 
choice; (2) patient health outcomes; and (3) hospital resource use. The regression model 
is the following:   ]KvgL + MNAgL > MRwgL > MUJKvgL > xv > yz > %L > XKvgL, 
 
where ]KvgL represents three types of outcomes: (1) procedure choice (a binary variable 
indicating C-section or vaginal delivery), (2) patient health outcomes, and (3) hospital 
resource utilization (logarithm of CPI-deflated hospital expenditures) for individual 
patient i attended by physician j at quarter t in market k. AgL is a vector of hospital market 
competition measures, which is calculated using the probabilities predicted by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 In each insurance category for each quarter, patient’s preference parameters for choosing a 
hospital also vary by patient’s pre-existing medical conditions and whether she is a case of 
previous c-section or multiple pregnancies.  
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conditional logit model. wgL is a vector of weighted market characteristics variables, JKvgL is a vector of patient characteristics, yz is a set of the county dummies, xv,is a set of 
physician dummies, and %L is a set of quarter dummies.  
 
I use five different measures for the quality of hospital service at the market level. 
Patient’s procedure choice at the time of delivery: ]KvgL equals one if the patient had a C-
section and zero if the patient had a vaginal delivery. Preventable birth complications are 
major adverse events in the area of obstetrics, because most of the preventable birth 
complications could be avoided if the physicians or hospitals provide more effort. The 
health outcome dummy ]KvgL equals one if the patient exhibits any of the following ten 
preventable complications: maternal fever, excessive bleeding, maternal seizure, 
precipitous labor, prolonged labor, dysfunction labor, anesthetic complications, fetal 
distress, uterine rupture during labor, and choriamnionitis.  
 
Considering medical malpractice liability and incentives (financial and non-financial) 
associated with particular procedure choice, I also interact the procedure choice with a 
health outcome dummy to define a more medically appropriate and less risky procedure 
if the patient receiving a C-section exhibits none of preventable birth complications listed 
above, and a medically less appropriate and more risky procedure when the patient 
delivering vaginally exhibits any of these preventable birth complications. The last 
measure is hospital resource use represented by the patient’s total hospital expenditure, 
which is the logarithm of the CPI-adjusted (based on 1994 Medical CPI) individual level 
total hospital charges. 
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Hospital market competition is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which 
measures market concentration level using the sum of squares of each firm’s market 
share within a geographical area. As noted in the previous section, the HHIs in this study 
are calculated using the predicted market share for each hospital for each individual 
patient residing within 25 miles radius (distance between zip code centroids) of the 
hospital in each quarter, assuming the importance of travel distance for birth deliveries, in 
addition to the hospital quality and patient preferences. The predicted probabilities are 
then aggregated from the entire market and weighted to the zipcode level. Thus, the 
predicted market shares are exogenous. Further, because of the potential non-linear 
effects of market competition, I divide HHIs across the whole sample period (1995-2005) 
into four quartiles to measure the competition of the market at the zipcode level. HHI 
quartiles also vary by quarter t and zipcode k.  
 
Patient characteristics included in the regression model are: age, race/ethnicity, referral 
source (physician referral, transferred from another hospital), admission information (day 
of week), admission source (normal admission or admitted from emergency department), 
admission type (normal admission or emergency admission), and insurance type (Blue 
Cross and other commercial insurance). PHC4 claims data also provides information on 
patient diagnosis and procedures received during the hospital visit. One of the challenges 
in an obstetrics study using hospital claim data is that it is difficult to observe any 
preventive treatments that a pregnant woman received prior to her delivery admission. 
Therefore, to capture the variation in terms of patient pre-admissions health status, I 
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identify ten pre-existing medical conditions37 that may complicate the delivery process 
from individual patient’s ICD9 diagnosis codes, as well as six non-preventable birth 
complications38 that could not be successfully avoided by more effort the physicians or 
hospitals provide, as a set of proxy variables for patient health conditions prior to 
delivery.  
 
Other market characteristics included in the regression model are weighted with predicted 
patient flow to control for impacts other than competition and avoid the endogeneity 
problems using admitting hospital characteristics (patient self-selection). Other market 
characteristics (at the zip code level) included in the regression model are weighted 
percentage of teaching hospitals, weighted percentage of hospitals contracted with 
HMOs, weighted percentage of mid-sized hospitals (hospital bed size ranges from 200 to 
400) and large-sized hospitals (bed size over 400), and percentage of hospitals having 
established women health centers. To control for variations that might result from the 
entry and exit of hospitals in some markets, I also include the predicted market shares for 
hospital markets with any new entrances and exits for each quarter.  
 
Several studies use HMO enrollment as a measure of price competition in the market, 
where the managed care organizations selectively contract with healthcare providers to 
pay lower prices. Hospitals are more likely to trade price margin for the additional market 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Pre-existing medical conditions include malpresentation, herpes, diabetets mellitus/abnormal 
glucose tolerance, hypertensive disorder/eclampsia, oligohydramnios, incompetent cervix and 
other congenital/acquired anomaly, congenital/acquired abnormality of vagina, rhesus (anti-D) 
isoimmunization, anemia, and habitual aborter. 
38 Non-preventable birth complications include breech delivery, cephalopelvic disproportion, cord 
prolapsed previa, abruptio placenta and premature rupture of membranes. 
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share that could be brought by contracting with a large payer.  Therefore markets with 
lower HMO enrollment rates are more likely to engage in quality competition (Kessler 
and McClellan 2000). The effect of competition on cost containment will likely be higher 
in more competitive markets. To control for the managed care influence, I include county 
level HMO penetration rates in the regression model. 
 
To deal with the effects of unobservables on individual physician quality and practice 
patterns, county-level time-invariant characteristics and time trend, I use the individual 
physician fixed effects, county fixed effects and quarter fixed effects in the regression 
model. 
 
To test whether medical malpractice liability will encourage hospitals to engage in 
quality competition, I interact the competition dummies with a dummy indicating the 
level of jury friendliness at the county level.  TFE equals one if juries in medical 
malpractice law courts in hospital market k are usually more sympathetic towards victims 
(patients) and often decide verdicts in favor of the victims, and zero otherwise. TEE equals 
one if juries in the hospital market k are less in favor of the victims. The revised 
regression model is the following:    
 ]KvgL + MNAgL ? TFE > MRAgL ? TEE > MUwgL > M^ JKvgL > xv > yg > %L > XKvgL@,, 
 
County-level jury verdict records reflect the medical malpractice liability for obstetricians 
and hospitals. The frequency and size of medical malpractice verdicts reflect how 
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sympathetic juries are towards plaintiffs. Hospitals in a county where juries are more 
sympathetic to plaintiffs, in most cases patients, are more likely to require the defendants 
to pay larger awards. Even though defendant hospitals are most likely to be covered by 
their insurance, quality information conveyed by the large verdicts are inevitably and 
often widely broadcast to the public, which can harm the reputations of defendant 
hospitals. Because consumers are better informed of adverse events that occurred in 
hospitals, hospitals in jury friendlier markets are more likely to compete in quality, 
especially those who have been sued and lost the lawsuits. To retain the loss in market 
share, defendant hospitals could either provide higher quality of care or cut their prices 
for their services.   
 
The larger the size of the jury verdict, the greater the impact the medical malpractice 
lawsuit could have on the market quality elasticity. In this case, I measure the market jury 
friendliness by the size of verdicts at the county level (and counties in the upper 50 
percentile of total jury verdict number during 2000-2003). As a robustness check, I also 
use two alternative measures for the medical malpractice liability: (1) any county with 
one verdict that is more than 1 million US dollars during 2000-2003; (2) any county with 
ten or more verdicts during 2000-2003.  
 
The first alternative is a stronger measure for the impact of information about bad quality 
conveyed by large size verdicts (over one million dollars), cases in which many victims 
suffer from disability (employment unsuitability for women, or cerebral palsy for 
infants). Therefore a larger damage is assumed to affect quality elasticity more 
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significantly. The second alternative selects those counties where there were more than 
ten jury verdicts during 2000-2003, and measures the effect of quality information if 
hospitals in those markets frequently lose a medical malpractice case.  
 
Figure 3.1 lists detailed county level jury verdicts in Pennsylvania between 2000 and 
2003.39 Overall the number of jury verdicts is divided into four quartiles, with the level of 
dark shades indicating the level of jury friendliness. The darkest gray shades represent the 
counties with the friendliest juries (more than ten jury verdicts) and counties with white 
shades have one or no jury verdicts.   
 
As the average lawsuit process may take a long time40 from filing to the point at which 
the jury reaches a verdict, it is appropriate to use the 2000-2003 verdict information for 
this study period (1995-2005).  
 
3.6 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Hospital characteristics are obtained through the American Hospital Association Survey 
of hospitals from 1995 to 2005. The dataset identifies hospital teaching status, ownership, 
hospital beds, ultrasound services, service specialties (general/medical/surgical and ob-
gyn services), women health center services, and if the hospital has formal contracts with 
any HMO. In the hospital sample, I exclude hospitals with fewer than five birth claims 
per quarter.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 2000-2003 is the earliest jury verdict data provided on Pennsylvania’s Unified Judicial 
System’s webpage (http://) on the medical malpractice lawsuits. 
40 On average, it takes about four to five years to resolve a claim from the date of an adverse 
incident. 
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Patient-level information is derived from Pennsylvania in-hospital claim data provided by 
Pennsylvania Healthcare Cost Containment Counsel (PHC4) from the corresponding 
period (1995-2005). The claims are collected through standard medical billing 
information, which consists of patient’s personal information (personal ID, age, 
race/ethnicity, and home zip code), admission information (admitted hospital, admission 
date, admission source/type), insurance type, and the full set of diagnosis and procedure 
codes. The study sample includes Pennsylvania41 women with a valid personal ID and 
aged between 15 and 45 who were covered by Blue Cross and other commercial 
insurance and gave birth to a single child42 during the first quarter of 1995 and the last 
quarter of 2005. The entire sample includes 875,969 privately insured patients.  
 
HMO market penetration information is obtained from the Pennsylvania Department of 
Health. It summarizes the total number of HMO enrollments in each county each year, as 
well as the market penetration rates (using total population in the county as denominator).  
 
Pennsylvania medical malpractice jury verdict data is from the website of the unified 
judicial system of Pennsylvania for the period of 2000-2003. The data contain 
information on the numbers and categorical amounts of defense verdicts, and jury and 
non-jury medical malpractice verdicts.43  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Patients whose home residence is outside Pennsylvania are excluded from the sample.  
42 Because abortion is legal in Pennsylvania, I also exclude patients with abortive outcomes from 
the sample because it is difficult to identify if the patient self intended for the abortive procedure.  
43 The verdicts do not reflect post-trial settlements or actions of an appellate court. They are not 
actual payouts. Detailed information could be found at: 
http://www.aopc.org/Links/Media/MedicalMalpractice/default.htm$ 
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Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for patients and hospital markets characteristics by 
market competitiveness. Panel A of Table 3.1 reports patient sample characteristics. The 
most competitive markets account for almost half of the patient sample (48.9%). While 
statistics on patient procedure choice and health outcomes across all the markets are 
similar, average hospital expenditure in the most competitive markets is almost twice as 
large as that in less competitive markets. This suggests that hospitals in more competitive 
markets may use more resources to treat their patients. Patients in more competitive 
markets are older, and there are also more black and/or Hispanic patients in more 
competitive markets. Admission characteristics across the markets are also similar, 
except that more patients have emergency admissions or are admitted through the 
emergency department in more competitive markets.  
 
The average distance to the closest hospitals or average distance to the admission 
hospitals reflects the level of competitiveness in the market. The difference between the 
two indicates that patients are likely to choose a hospital other than the closest hospital to 
her home residence for birth delivery. Although distance is important in time of delivery, 
patients do select hospitals based on their preference for other characteristics. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.1 summarizes Pennsylvania hospital market characteristics by market 
competitiveness. Entrant and exit market shares are relatively smaller in more 
competitive markets. Small size hospitals (<200 beds) are prevalent across all the 
markets, and large hospitals are more likely to exist in more competitive markets. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Competitive markets also have more teaching hospitals. Hospitals in more competitive 
markets are more likely to contract with HMOs.  
 
3.7 Empirical Results 
3.7.1 Overall effects of hospital competition 
Table 3.2 reports the effects of hospital market competition on procedure choice, health 
outcomes, and hospital resource use among privately insured patients during the sample 
period (1995-2005). The most concentrated or the least competitive markets is a base 
group (omitted group). All regressions control for individual physician fixed effects, 
county fixed effects and quarter fixed effects.  
 
Column 1 reports that more C-sections are performed in more competitive markets, and 
many C-sections occurred without any incidence of preventable birth complications, as 
indicated in column 2. Also hospitals in more competitive markets have fewer vaginal 
deliveries that accompanied one or more preventable birth complications. Overall, 
hospital competition is quality improving. Hospitals in more competitive markets on 
average have about 1% fewer preventable birth complications incidence, which does not 
come at a price of significantly more hospital resources being used in the treatment of 
patients44. As noted in the theory, competition may both increase quality and price 
elasticity. The estimates imply the overall effect of hospital competition increases the 
quality elasticity more than the price elasticity. The significant estimates among the very !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Estimates are adjusted with different procedure choice for the large differential in 
reimbursement rates between C-section and vaginal delivery. 
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competitive and competitive markets confirm that price is less of an issue among 
privately insured patients (only to their insurance providers), to whom a good C-section 
(without any adverse events on health outcomes) would be more preferred since 
utilization reviews are not common in birth delivery choice.  
 
Table 3.2 also reports the effects of other market characteristics on the variables of 
interest. Overall markets with higher percentage of teaching hospitals have lower C-
section rates, higher rates of preventable birth complications, and use less hospital 
resources. Plausibly patients are more likely to be diagnosed with some level of 
preventable birth complications because teaching hospitals are more equipped with 
advanced technology and high quality physicians. Markets with more large-size hospitals 
(more than 200 beds) are more likely to perform C-sections, especially good ones, 
suggesting that larger hospitals tend to use their capacities efficiently to perform more 
good C-sections when confronted with thinning profit margins at a time of a medical 
malpractice crisis and managed care cost containment pressure. Also markets with more 
large hospitals have lower level of preventable birth complications and use significantly 
more hospital resources on patients.  
 
Hospital market competition due to hospital entry reduces C-section incidence and 
preventable birth complications without employing significantly more hospital resources, 
which reveals the quality improving effect of hospital competition through another 
perspective. Equally interesting, estimates on hospital markets with more exiting 
competitors suggests slightly negative impact on patient health outcomes.  
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3.7.2 Effect of hospital competition in markets with differing medical malpractice 
liability pressure 
One major research question of this study is to address the effect of competition when the 
medical malpractice liability is prevalent in the marketplace. Table 3.3 reports separate 
estimates on the effects of hospital market competition interacting with the county level 
of jury friendliness in medical malpractice lawsuits. Specifically, I measure the county 
level medical malpractice pressure using as a dummy whether the county is in the upper 
50 percentile of total jury verdict number across all the counties.  
 
Although medical malpractice litigation may only impose a small financial burden to the 
hospitals, such as administrative expenses, damage payouts45 if awarded, and potential 
increase in hospital medical malpractice premiums, it sends out disastrous quality 
indications to the market which possibly damage the defendant hospital’s reputation 
severely. The size of awards is likely to be positively correlated with the magnitude of 
such damage. Counties with friendlier juries are more likely to award verdicts to the 
victim46, especially those large size verdicts that usually enjoy greater publicity in the 
media. Therefore I assume that hospitals competing in the markets with friendly juries are 
more concerned with the quality of their health service, in fear of more and larger awards 
and greater damage to their reputations. If markets with friendlier juries are more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 The size of payout is a complex matter, which depends on the defendant hospital’s insurance 
policy. The defendant hospital may up to its deductible.  
46 During the period 2000-2003 in Pennsylvania, the average number of verdicts ordered among 
the counties with friendlier juries is about 37.47 cases per county compared with 1.34 cases per 
county among less friendly counties.  
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concerned with quality, which is more likely to have higher quality elasticity of demand, 
hospitals will engage in more quality competition where the effect of competition will 
increase quality. Estimates in Table 3.3 provide consistent evidence on this hypothesis. 
Facing higher medical malpractice liability, hospitals in more competitive markets 
perform more good C-sections and the preventable birth complications are 1% lower than 
in those most concentrated markets. Competition also drives hospitals to employ more 
hospital resources in treating their patients when their medical malpractice liability is 
higher. By contrast, the effects of hospital market competition are less significant in the 
markets where juries had never ordered a verdict that is larger than one million dollars.  
 
One very important point that I make here is that the results in Table 3.3 are not a 
recommendation to create more medically liable hospital markets and thus are not in 
favor of high and frequent lawsuits involving medical malpractice, but rather they are an 
emphasis on the increased quality elasticity due to competition, given the argument that 
medical malpractice lawsuits serve as indicators of poor quality that influence the public 
when choosing healthcare providers. The unintended consequence for a hospital to be in a 
market where medical malpractice lawsuits are frequent and juries are much friendlier to 
the plaintiffs is that that hospital is more motivated to compete over quality because the 
net benefit of improving quality outweighs the net benefit of reducing price47. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 If thinning profit margin leads to lower quality of care provided (Encinosa and Bernard, 2005), 
hospitals in more medical liable market may also be more subject to the additional medical 
malpractice costs (reputation damages) due to the lower quality of care.   
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3.7.3 Would hospital competition drive the hospitals to treat patients of differing health 
conditions accordingly?  
Patient’s specific medical conditions are often factored into the joint decision of 
procedure choice in delivery. As many malpractice lawsuits use failure to perform an in-
time C-section as grounds for lawsuits and evidence against the defendants48, C-sections 
are medically appropriate for patients who exhibit certain medical conditions prior to 
delivery. Table 3.4 provides evidence that the effects of hospital market competition on 
procedure choice mostly affect patients who have certain medical conditions where 
medical malpractice pressure is higher in the market. Facing higher medical malpractice 
pressure, hospitals in more competitive markets perform more C-sections to patients who 
have any of the previously discussed medical conditions or non-preventable birth 
complications. However, hospitals do not seem to treat their patients differently. Both 
patient groups (healthy and sick) in more competitive markets where medical malpractice 
liability is higher experienced lower preventable birth complications, and hospitals in 
those markets used more resources, compared to the effects of competition in the markets 
where medical malpractice liability is lower.  
 
Hospital competition also does not differ much among patients with a previous C-section 
and those have never had a C-section. Table 3.5 reports the estimates on these two 
subsamples. Consistent with previous findings, hospitals engage in quality competition in 
markets where medical malpractice liability is higher. However, there is no significant 
practice pattern across markets with different levels of competition suggested by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 As listed by many medical malpractice law firms, failure to perform an in-time C-section as 
one of the common delivery errors that could be used as grounds of a lawsuit. 
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procedure choice and hospital expenditures. Overall hospitals do not differentiate patients 
by whether the patient has a previous C-section as hospital competition improves quality 
in both groups.  
 
3.7.4 What Happened to Hospital Competition if Liability is Lower and Reporting 
Quality Information is Easier? Effect of MCARE in Pennsylvania 
MCARE in 2002 took significant steps to improve patient safety and reduce medical 
errors. The majority of measures taken have focused on the collection and availability of 
quality information from the healthcare providers within the state. For example, under 
MCARE, a new Safety Authority is created collect information on medical errors, which 
is also being collected by the state health department. Medical facilities are required to 
notify patients affected by a serious event in writing within seven days and the state 
Medical Board is granted with more authority to investigate reports of serious provider 
error. Physicians are required to report various offences, including liability complaints, to 
the Medical Board. It also prohibits retaliation against health care workers reporting 
serious events. Such enforcement has significantly reduced the transaction costs of 
reporting adverse events, which plausibly would make healthcare providers in the market 
more aware of the quality of care they provide due to the fact that MCARE has made the 
adverse event reporting mechanism much clearer and quality information is potentially 
more widely available to the public. 
 
I investigate the effects of hospital competition before and after the enactment of 
MCARE in 2002, where the results are reported in Table 3.6. Prior to 2002, hospitals 
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engaged in quality competition in the counties where the probability to be sued for an 
adverse event was higher. Competition overall slightly reduced the incidence of C-
sections, as C-sections are relatively risky for both mothers and infants. Also prior to 
2002, health outcomes (vaginal birth with complications and preventable birth 
complications) were better in more competitive markets. With clear guidelines on adverse 
event reporting after 2002, competition continues to improve quality more significantly, 
especially in the markets where the threat of a medical malpractice lawsuit is higher. 
Together with findings in Table 3.4, hospitals in more competitive markets start to 
perform more C-sections on less healthy patients who exhibit one of the listed medical 
conditions or non-preventable birth complications after MCARE reduces the healthcare 
providers’ medical malpractice liability. According to the Institute of Medicine’s report 
on medical errors (To Err is Human 1999), both physicians and hospitals have more 
incentives to avoid the potential adverse event that had been made more easily reportable. 
Besides the high frequency of failing to perform a C-section cited in medical malpractice 
lawsuits, performing a C-section on patients with certain medical conditions reduces the 
probability of more birth complications later on if vaginal delivery is chosen. One thing 
to notice is that, although mothers in more competitive markets may be more likely to 
request a C-section due to work and other reasons49, their healthcare providers (mainly 
physicians) still serve as a joint decision maker, who will be likely to turn down the 
request if the stakes of performing a maternally requested C-section is too high, 
especially when the patient is healthy (Currie and MacLeod 2008). Consistent with Table 
3.6, estimates on the procedure choice before 2002 do not show a significant pattern that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!+&!K71;!4B993=:78!:0393h1!=;!3>2"9"467!3#"<3=43!;=!:03!9"1"=E!:93=<!;5!>6:39=67!93LB31:3<!PM134:";=!IF34739L!)--.J$!
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mothers in more competitive markets have more C-sections and the surge of C-section 
rates occurred right after the MCARE enactment, which provides evidence on the formal 
case that MCARE increases hospital incentives to perform more C-sections to reduce the 
potential birth complications among the less healthy patients.  
 
3.7.5 Robustness Check 
To provide evidence that the paper’s findings do not vary with the definition of jury 
friendliness, I also use two alternative measures of jury friendliness to investigate the 
effect of hospital competition with the specification (2). The findings are consistent with 
the main jury friendliness definition as suggested by Table 3.7. Using different 
geographical definitions for jury friendliness also suggests that venue shopping does not 
pose a significant threat to this study due to the nature of regionalized birth markets. 
Patients are less likely to travel long distance to receive birth care for the purposes of 
shopping for a potential jury venue that is friendlier to the plaintiffs.  
 
As another robustness check, I also use various fixed effects to check if the results are 
affected by other unobservables. Table 3.8 reports consistent estimates on the major 
quality variable (preventable birth complications).  
 
3.8 Conclusion and Discussion 
This study examines the impact of medical malpractice lawsuits on the effect of hospital 
competition in one of the most common but understudied hospital services: obstetrics. 
During the period 1995-2005, hospital competition among hospitals in Pennsylvania is 
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overall quality improving, as suggested by lower preventable birth complications, lower 
adverse vaginal births, and complication-free C-sections. Medical malpractice lawsuits 
serve as a hazardous quality indicator of overall hospital services, which affects potential 
hospital market share. In the markets where hospitals are more likely to be involved in 
medical malpractice lawsuits, especially those with large verdicts, hospitals compete 
more on the quality, as patients in those markets are more likely to be aware of the 
quality of care being offered. The paper also finds that hospitals do not compete based on 
the severity of patients and quality improvement due to competition appears to be the 
same for both the healthy and less healthy patients. The paper does not find any 
difference between patients who had a previous C-section and those who had not.  
 
Another interesting finding is the effect of hospital competition on procedure choice in 
obstetrics. Overall more C-sections are performed in more competitive markets. 
Providing evidence against the hypothesis that maternally requested C-sections are more 
likely to occur in cities where competition is stronger, this paper finds that competition 
significantly increases the incidence of C-section among less healthy patients, and argues 
that the increase in C-section rates due to healthcare providers’ adaptation to the quality-
driven competition atmosphere after MCARE lowered the transaction cost of reporting 
adverse events. Easier access to quality information (mostly from adverse events) has 
encouraged healthcare providers to deviate from the standard practice and to become 
more risk averse, and therefore perform more C-sections among less healthy patients to 
reduce the chance of potential birth complications.  
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The case of MCARE proposes a very interesting direction for current medical 
malpractice liability reform debates. A medically more liable hospital market has showed 
its potentials to excel in quality if competition is prevalent in this market. Hospitals 
compete for higher quality in the fear of being involved in a medical malpractice lawsuit 
that could potentially send information about bad quality to the market. Considering that 
MCARE imposes guidelines to report quality information while reducing all healthcare 
providers’ medical malpractice liability, the similar effects of competition on incidence of 
preventable birth complications before and after 2002 suggest that availability of quality 
information and medical malpractice liability might be substitutes. However, the latter 
one is frequently cited as one of the main drivers for the current drastically increasing 
healthcare costs.  
 
3.9 Limitations and Discussion 
One major limitation in this study is that the conditional logit model requires the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIR) assumption — it assumes that the patient 
makes choices by comparing only two hospitals at a time. The method could be improved 
by using mixed logit or nested logit models.  
 
Different quality and resource use enters patient's utility function differently especially in 
this study. I use medical malpractice lawsuit as one of the quality information indicator. 
However, the jury verdicts reports are collected at the county level during 2000-2005, 
and they do not indicate a specific hospital name, physician name/license, or zip code. 
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More variation may be available if I have detailed medical malpractice lawsuits/jury 
verdict information to calculate the market competitiveness measure. 
 
Although I have used various quality indicators such as stillborn incidence, maternal 
death, readmission within one year, unnecessary C-section and vaginal birth with medical 
conditions, I have only been able to find significant changes on the preventable birth 
complications. The patient level quality indicator lacks variation probably because of the 
less severe nature of obstetric practice.  
 
Personal practice patterns of physicians differ, which may influence patient treatment 
decisions greatly. The hospital market measure perhaps may also account for the 
physician influence by including the physician characteristics. 
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3.10 Appendix: HHI calculation 
3.10.1 Predict Individual Probability of Hospital Choice 
Each individual patient i covered by insurance o (Blue Cross or other commercial 
insurance) has a chance to choose hospital j from j hospitals within 25 miles of her 
residence (center of her home zipcode) by maximizing an indirect utility function of the 
form j{|} + r{|} >,~{|} > {|} 
 
where r{|Ä and ~{|Ä, the deterministic components of the utility function for insurance type 
o, are variables representing hospital and patient’s characteristics.  Let {|Ä  denote patient 
i’s (with insurance o) unobserved preference for hospital j. We assume {|Ä  follows the 
generalized extreme value distribution.  
 r{|Ä is a vector of variables included to measure differences among the hospitals in a 
patient’s choice set with respect to travel distance and three other hospital characteristics:  
number of beds, whether it has women health center, and whether it is a teaching 
hospital.  I first identify the closest hospital j’ with any characteristics h to each patient’s 
zip code:  this is the reference hospital with characteristic j. Then each hospital j that exist 
the patient’s choice set is compared to the reference hospital in the dimension of 
characteristics h.  First, I calculate how much further a patient must travel to each 
hospital j beyond the reference hospital in order to enjoy the specific hospital 
characteristics h, as well as their difference in distance to patient i’s home zipcode, or 
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relative distance with respect to characteristics h.  Second, I separate the relative 
distances when the characteristics h of choice hospital is the same as the reference 
hospital, from the relative distances when they are different in terms of characteristics h, 
since the former one indicates the cost for the patient to obtain the same characteristics h 
from a hospital that is further away from her residence and the latter is a trade-off for her 
to enjoy some characteristics that the nearest hospital does not provide.  
 
I then group the relative distance variables, drawing boundaries at the twenty-fifth, 
fiftieth and seventy-fifth percentile of the distribution of the respective relative distances 
to create same/different-type quartile dummies, and interact the same/different-type 
categories with same/different-type relative distance quartiles.  Assuming a linear and 
additively separable function of such interactions between hospital characteristics and 
relative distance, we have r{|} + Å ÇÇ{|ÉÑÖÜNÉá{|É > ÜRÉàY . á{|Éâä > ÇÇ{|ÉãÖÜUÉá{|É > ÜÉ^àY . á{|ÉâäåÉçN ; 
 
where ÇÇ{|ÉÑ and ÇÇ{|Éã are same/different-type relative distance quartiles, respectively, 
and á{|É is a vector of dichotomized hospital characteristics including bed sizes (<200 
beds, 200 beds to 400 beds, >400 beds), teaching status, whether the hospital have formal 
contract with a HMO and woman health center. The vector [ÜNÉ$ ÜRÉ$ ÜUÉ$ ÜÉ^] is the 
parameter of interest. A graphic description of the comparison scheme could be 
illustrated as follows: 
 
                        Choice Hospital j has same characteristic j has different characteristic  
,&!!
Reference Hospital 
Given j’ has character á|éÉ + Y ÜNÉ ÜÉ^ 
Given j’ has character á|éÉ + 4 ÜRÉ ÜUÉ 
 
In a conditional logit, I observe a single patient making a choice among hospitals with 
different characteristics:  the individual patient’s characteristics are obviously the same as 
they consider the different hospitals and cannot be entered as separate variables.  
However, we can include the possible effect of patients’ characteristics on their choice of 
hospital by interacting them with different hospital characteristics.  Thus, I also consider 
patient’s average preferences on different hospital characteristics by interacting each 
patient’s characteristics with hospital j’s characteristics:  
~{| + èê{åÉçN á|ÉëÉí,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"ì* 
 ê{ is a vector of patient i’s characteristics (gender, ethnicity/race, admission type, pre-
existing medical condition, multiple pregnancy, previous c-section, etc).  Therefore, ëÉ 
controls for patients’ average response or preferences to hospital j’s characteristic h.  
 
From McFadden (1978, 1981), assuming the generalized extreme value distribution 
implies that the conditional choice probability is given by: 
îï{| + ñóàò{| + Yâ + ôöõúùÑûüúùÅ ôöõúùÑûüúù|†° í, 
Then, we can estimate the vector Ü and ë by maximizing the log-likelihood function: 
&-!!
m¢£ m + èèm¢£,îï {|,°|çN§{çN í 
 
The patient samples are estimated year by year from 1995 to 2005 where we allow 
different effects of different years.  
 
3.10.2 Constructing HHIs 
Given patients’ indirect utility function maximized through the conditional logit model, 
we predict a patient’s probability ( îï{|) of attending the hospitals. We construct the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on observable, exogenous characteristics of patients 
and hospitals as in Kessler and McClellan (2000). First, we calculate the market share of 
each hospital j in each zip code k area by summing the predicted patient flow for hospital 
j over all the market shares of hospitals in area k. 
•|p + Å îï{|{¶pÅ Å îï{|{¶p°|çN í 
 
Thus, if we assume that hospitals “are able to differentiate among patients based on their 
zip code of residence,” then the predicted HHI for patients residing in zip code k is 
ßß®p©™´ +è•ï|pR°|çN í 
However, it is more realistic to presume that hospitals compete over “the total demand 
for hospital services from all nearby areas.” So we must measure the share of a hospital’s 
predicted demand coming from a given zip code 
&'!!
ßß®|É}k© + èë¨p| ? ßß®p©™´í≠pçN  
 
where 
ë¨p| + Å îï{|{†pÅ îï{|§{çN í 
 
represents the share of hospital j’s predicted demand coming from zip code k. 
But ultimately, we use another measure as our HHI; one which is “based on the vector of 
average expected probabilities of hospital choice in the patient’s zip of residence.” We 
define it as follows 
ßß®p©™´? + è•ï|p ? ßß®|É}k©í°|çN  
 
Following this transformation of  îï{| , we obtain a competition metric that functions just 
like the more traditional HHI.  ßß®p©™´? is bounded below by zero and above by one; 
additionally, ßß®p©™´? is decreasing in competition. Although this measure is significantly 
more empirically intensive than the standard fixed or variable radius indices, ßß®p©™´? is 
formulated through exogenous determinants of hospital demand, and thus not subject to 
the endogeneity with respect to hospital outcomes. In other words, changes in ßß®p©™´? 
originate from three sources: variations in the sizes of hospital markets – through 
openings, closures and mergers, changes in a potential patient’s decision to attend a 
hospital based off of distance, and changes in the distribution of patient population.  
&)!!
  
&%!!
3.11 Reference 
Alexander, Jeffrey, Morrisey, Michael and Shortell, Stephen, 1986. “Effects of 
Competition, Regulation, and Corporatization on Hospital-Physician Relationships,” 
Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 27(3), 220–235. 
 
Baker, Laurence, 2001. “Measuring Competition in Health Care Markets,” Health 
Services Research, 36(1), 223–251. 
 
Baker, Laurence and Corts, Kenneth, 1996. “HMO Penetration and the Cost of Health 
Care: Market Discipline or Market Segmentation?” American Economic Review, 86(2), 
389–394. 
 
Capps, Cory, Dranove, David and Lindrooth, Richard, 2009. “Hospital Closure and 
Economic Efficiency,” Journal of Health Economics, 29(1), 87–109. 
 
Dorfman, Robert and Steiner, Peter, 1954. “Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality,” 
American Economic Review, 44(5), 826–836. 
 
Dranove, David and Satterthwaite, Mark, “The Industrial Organization of Health Care 
Markets,” in Culyer, Anthony and Newhouse, Joseph, Handbook of Health Economics, 
Elsevier. 
 
Encinosa, William and Bernard, Didem, 2005. “Hospital Finances and Patient Safety 
Outcomes,” Inquiry, 42(1), 60–72. 
 
Gaynor, Martin, 2006. “What Do We Know About Competition and Quality in Health 
Care Markets?” NBER Working Paper Series No 12301. 
 
&+!!
Gaynor, Martin and Haas-Wilson, Deborah, 1999. “Change, Consolidation, and 
Competition in Health Care Markets,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(1), 141–
164. 
 
Gowrisankaran, Gautam and Town, Robert, 2003. “Competition, Payers, and Hospital 
Quality,” Health Services Research, 38, 1403–1422. 
 
Kessler, Daniel and McClellan, Mark, 2000. “Is Hospital Competition Socially 
Wasteful?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(2), 577–615. 
 
Kessler, Daniel and McClellan, Mark, 2002. “Malpractice Law and Health Care Reform: 
Optimal Liability Policy in an Era of Managed Care,” Journal of Public Economics, 
84(2), 175–197. 
 
Kessler, Daniel and Geppert, Jeffery, 2005. “The Effects of Competition on Variation in 
the Quality and Cost of Medical Care,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 
14(3), 575–589. 
 
Lyon, Thomas, 1999. “Quality Competition, Insurance, and Consumer Choice in Health 
Care Markets,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 8(4), 545–580. 
 
Ma, Ching-to Albert and Burgess, James, 1993. “Quality Competition, Welfare, and 
Regulation,” Journal of Economics, 58(2), 153–173. 
 
Morlock, Laura and Malitz, Faye, 1991. “Do Hospital Risk Management Programs Make 
a Difference? Relationships between Risk Management Program Activities and Hospital 
Malpractice Claims Experience,” Law and Contemporary Problems, 54(2), 1–22.  
 
&*!!
Mukamel, Dana, Zwanziger, Jack and Bamezai, Anil, 2002. “Hospital Comeptition, 
Resource Allocation and Quality of Care,” BMC Health Services Research, 2(1), 10–18. 
 
Mukamel, Dana, Zwanziger, Jack and Tomaszewski, Kenneth, 2001. “HMO Penetration, 
Competition and Risk-adjusted Hospital Mortality,” Health Services Research, 36(6), 
1019–1035. 
 
Noether, Monica, 1988. “Competition among Hospitals,” Journal of Health Economics, 
7(3), 259–284. 
 
Pauly, Mark and Redisch, Michael, 1973. “The Not-for-profit Hospital as a Physicians’ 
Cooperative,” American Economic Review, 63(1), 87–99. 
 
Pauly, Mark, 2004. “Competition in Medical Services and the Quality of Care: Concepts 
and History,” Medical Care, 4(2), 113–130. 
 
Propper, Carol, Burgess, Simon, and Gossage, Denise, 2008. “Competition and Quality: 
Evidence from the NHS Internal Market 1991-9,” Economic Journal, 118(525), 138–170.  
 
Sage, William, Hyman, David and Greenberg, Warren, 2003. “Why Competition Matters 
to Health Care Quality,” Health Affairs, 22(2), 31–44. 
 
Sari, Nazmi, 2002. “Do Competition and Managed Care Improve Quality?” Health 
Economics, 11(7), 571–584. 
 
Scanlon, Dennis, Swaminathan, Shailender, Lee, Woolton and Chernew, Michael, 2008. 
“Does Competition Improve Health Care Quality?” Health Services Research, 43(6), 
&.!!
1931–1951. 
 
Shen, Yu-Chu, 2003. “The Effects of Regulation Competition, and Ownership on 
Mortality Rates among Hospital Inpatients.” Journal of Health Economics, 22(2), 243–
269. 
 
Sohn, M. W. and Rathouz, P. J., (2003). ‘Competition among Hospitals and quality of 
Care: Hospital-level Analysis’. unpublished paper, University of Chicago. 
 
Tay, Amy, 2003. “Assessing Competition in Hospital Care Markets: The Importance of 
Accounting for Quality Differentiation,” RAND Journal of Economics, 34(4), 786–814 
 
Wong, Herbert, McNamara, Peggy and Greenberg, Warren, 2004. “Provider Competition 
and Health Care Quality: Challenges and Opportunities for Research,” Medical Care, 
4(2), 99–111. 
&(!
!
 
   
Ta
ble
 3.
1a
 D
esc
rip
tiv
e S
tat
ist
ics
 of
 Pa
tie
nt 
Ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s, 
Ho
sp
ita
l C
ha
rac
ter
ist
ics
 an
d M
ark
et 
Str
uc
tur
e o
ve
r 1
99
5 -
 20
05
 
M
os
t C
om
pe
titi
ve
 
Ve
ry 
Co
mp
eti
tiv
e 
Co
mp
eti
tiv
e 
Le
ss 
Co
mp
eti
tiv
e 
Pa
ne
l A
: P
ati
en
t C
ha
ra
cte
ris
tic
s  
Re
so
ur
ce
 us
e &
 he
alt
h o
utc
om
es
 
C-
sec
tio
n I
nc
ide
nc
e 
23
.67
% 
22
.84
% 
23
.17
% 
23
.79
% 
C-
sec
tio
n w
/o 
Pr
ev
en
tab
le 
Bi
rth
 C
om
pli
ca
tio
ns
 
19
.21
% 
18
.58
% 
18
.43
% 
19
.06
% 
Va
gin
al 
Bi
rth
 w
/ P
rev
en
tab
le 
Bi
rth
 C
om
pli
ca
tio
ns
 
7.8
1%
 
7.0
9%
 
9.4
3%
 
7.8
3%
 
An
y p
rev
en
tab
le 
bir
th 
co
mp
lic
ati
on
s 
12
.27
% 
11
.36
% 
14
.18
% 
12
.56
% 
 T
ota
l H
os
pit
al 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re*
  
 $ 
   9
,99
3.0
1  
 $ 
   5
,28
1.0
6  
 $ 
   4
,78
0.6
2  
 $ 
   4
,16
3.4
9  
Ad
mi
ssi
on
 ch
ar
ac
ter
ist
ics
 
Ag
e g
rou
p 1
: 1
5-2
5 
18
.64
% 
24
.70
% 
26
.85
% 
29
.59
% 
Ag
e g
rou
p 2
: 2
6-3
5 
65
.13
% 
63
.07
% 
62
.04
% 
60
.52
% 
Ag
e g
rou
p 3
: 3
5 a
nd
 ab
ov
e 
16
.23
% 
12
.23
% 
11
.11
% 
9.9
0%
 
Pa
tie
nt 
rac
e: 
Bl
ac
k 
12
.32
% 
2.5
0%
 
2.7
0%
 
1.2
0%
 
Pa
tie
nt 
eth
nic
ity
: H
isp
an
ic 
3.5
2%
 
2.3
1%
 
2.2
4%
 
0.9
4%
 
 
Pa
tie
nt 
is 
ref
err
ed
 by
 ph
ys
ici
an
s, 
cli
nic
 or
 H
M
O 
97
.52
% 
98
.08
% 
98
.67
% 
98
.38
% 
Ad
mi
ssi
on
 on
 fr
ida
ys
 
15
.20
% 
15
.36
% 
15
.69
% 
15
.98
% 
Ad
mi
ssi
on
 on
 w
ee
ke
nd
s (
Sa
tur
da
y/S
un
da
y) 
20
.49
% 
19
.48
% 
20
.05
% 
20
.12
% 
Em
erg
en
cy
 ad
mi
ssi
on
s 
7.2
4%
 
10
.17
% 
6.5
1%
 
3.4
7%
 
Ad
mi
ssi
on
 vi
a e
me
rge
nc
y d
ep
art
me
nt 
2.1
9%
 
1.3
3%
 
0.8
6%
 
0.7
0%
 
Bl
ue
 cr
os
s 
53
.73
% 
60
.11
% 
56
.76
% 
59
.04
% 
Co
mm
erc
ial
 In
su
ran
ce
 
46
.27
% 
39
.89
% 
43
.24
% 
40
.96
% 
Di
sta
nc
e v
ar
iab
les
 
Di
sta
nc
e t
o t
he
 cl
os
est
 ho
sp
ita
l (
mi
les
) 
2.9
1 
4.8
8 
5.5
6 
6.0
8 
M
ea
n d
ist
an
ce
 to
 ad
mi
ssi
on
 ho
sp
ita
l (
mi
les
) 
6.4
1 
9.4
6 
10
.78
 
14
.34
 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
Pa
tie
nts
 
42
84
67
 
16
86
35
 
16
83
54
 
11
05
13
 
Pr
ev
en
tab
le 
bir
th 
co
mp
lic
ati
on
s i
nc
lud
es 
on
e o
r m
ore
 of
 th
e f
oll
ow
ing
: m
ate
rna
l f
ev
er,
 ex
ce
ssi
ve
 bl
ee
din
g, 
ma
ter
na
l s
eiz
ure
, p
rec
ipi
tou
s l
ab
or,
 pr
olo
ng
ed
 
lab
or,
 dy
sfu
nc
tio
n l
ab
or,
 an
est
he
tic
 co
mp
lic
ati
on
s, 
fet
al 
dis
tre
ss,
 ut
eri
ne
 ru
ptu
re 
du
rin
g l
ab
or 
an
d c
ho
ria
mn
ion
itis
. T
he
 w
ho
le 
sam
ple
 in
clu
de
s p
ati
en
t a
ge
d 
15
-45
 co
ve
red
 by
 bl
ue
 cr
os
s o
r c
om
me
rci
al 
ins
ura
nc
e w
ho
 ga
ve
 bi
rth
 in
 a 
ho
sp
ita
l th
at 
ha
ve
 at
 le
ast
 fi
ve
 bi
rth
 de
liv
eri
es 
pe
r q
ua
rte
r d
uri
ng
 19
95
 an
d 2
00
5, 
an
d a
ll t
he
 pa
tie
nts
 se
lec
ted
 ar
e s
ing
let
on
 bi
rth
s. 
!
&(!
&,!
!    T
ab
le 
3.1
b D
esc
rip
tiv
e S
tat
ist
ics
 of
 Pa
tie
nt 
Ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s, 
Ho
sp
ita
l C
ha
rac
ter
ist
ics
 an
d M
ark
et 
Str
uc
tur
e o
ve
r 1
99
5 -
 20
05
 
M
os
t C
om
pe
titi
ve
 
Ve
ry 
Co
mp
eti
tiv
e 
Co
mp
eti
tiv
e 
Le
ss 
Co
mp
eti
tiv
e 
Pa
ne
l B
: M
ar
ke
t C
om
pe
titi
ve
ne
ss 
M
ea
su
re 
(H
HI
) &
 W
eig
hte
d O
the
r H
os
pit
al 
M
ar
ke
t C
ha
ra
cte
ris
tic
s 
Av
era
ge
 M
ark
et 
HH
I 
0.1
95
 
0.3
86
 
0.4
94
 
0.6
70
 
En
tra
nt 
M
ark
et 
Sh
are
 
0.0
43
 
0.0
92
 
0.1
23
 
0.1
65
 
Ex
ite
r M
ark
et 
Sh
are
 
0.0
47
 
0.0
64
 
0.0
84
 
0.0
75
 
Te
ac
hin
g s
tat
us
 
0.3
11
 
0.1
77
 
0.1
21
 
0.0
60
 
Fo
rm
al 
co
ntr
ac
t w
ith
 an
 H
M
O 
0.6
37
 
0.5
97
 
0.4
53
 
0.3
73
 
Ho
sp
ita
l s
ize
 (<
20
0 b
ed
s) 
0.4
90
 
0.6
02
 
0.7
35
 
0.8
30
 
Ho
sp
ita
l s
ize
 (>
=2
00
 an
d <
40
0 b
ed
s) 
0.2
99
 
0.2
86
 
0.1
81
 
0.1
39
 
Ho
sp
ita
l s
ize
 (>
= 6
00
 be
ds
) 
0.2
12
 
0.1
12
 
0.0
84
 
0.0
32
 
Co
nta
in 
wo
ma
n h
ea
lth
 ce
nte
r 
0.5
35
 
0.4
56
 
0.3
07
 
0.2
07
 
Pr
ev
en
tab
le 
bir
th 
co
mp
lic
ati
on
s i
nc
lud
es 
on
e o
r m
ore
 of
 th
e f
oll
ow
ing
: m
ate
rna
l f
ev
er,
 ex
ce
ssi
ve
 bl
ee
din
g, 
ma
ter
na
l s
eiz
ure
, 
pre
cip
ito
us
 la
bo
r, p
rol
on
ge
d l
ab
or,
 dy
sfu
nc
tio
n l
ab
or,
 an
est
he
tic
 co
mp
lic
ati
on
s, 
fet
al 
dis
tre
ss,
 ut
eri
ne
 ru
ptu
re 
du
rin
g l
ab
or 
an
d 
ch
ori
am
nio
nit
is.
 T
he
 w
ho
le 
sam
ple
 in
clu
de
s p
ati
en
t a
ge
d 1
5-4
5 c
ov
ere
d b
y b
lue
 cr
os
s o
r c
om
me
rci
al 
ins
ura
nc
e w
ho
 ga
ve
 bi
rth
 in
 
a h
os
pit
al 
tha
t h
av
e a
t le
ast
 fi
ve
 bi
rth
 de
liv
eri
es 
pe
r q
ua
rte
r d
uri
ng
 19
95
 an
d 2
00
5, 
an
d a
ll t
he
 pa
tie
nts
 se
lec
ted
 ar
e s
ing
let
on
 
bir
ths
. 
  
!
&,!
&&!!
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Effects of Hospital Competition on Procedure Choice, Health Outcome and Hospital Resource 
Use among Privately Insured Patients 
  
C-section 
C-section 
without Any 
Preventable 
Birth  
Complications 
Vaginal Birth 
with One or 
More 
Preventable 
Birth 
Complications 
Preventable 
Birth 
Complication
s 
Total 
Hospital 
Expenditure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Most Competitive  0.0096*** 0.0086*** -0.0080** -0.0081** 0.0079 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.012] 
Very Competitive 0.0048** 0.0060*** -0.0098*** -0.0115*** 0.0137 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.009] 
Competitive 0.0032 0.0025 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0002 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.006] 
Teaching status -0.0463*** -0.0578*** 0.0681*** 0.0850*** -0.3945*** 
[0.015] [0.016] [0.017] [0.020] [0.057] 
Formal contract with 
an HMO 
-0.0105 -0.0067 0.0004 -0.0022 -0.1564*** 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.011] [0.034] 
Hospital size (>=200 
and <400 beds) 
0.0377*** 0.0445*** -0.0534*** -0.0646*** 0.4640*** 
[0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.050] 
Hospital size (>=600 
beds) 
0.0363* 0.0602*** -0.1053*** -0.1334*** 1.1276*** 
[0.021] [0.021] [0.023] [0.028] [0.095] 
Contain woman health 
center 
-0.0046 -0.0175* 0.0340*** 0.0474*** -0.1295*** 
[0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.013] [0.043] 
Entrant Share -0.0097** -0.0045 -0.0096** -0.0136** 0.0110 
[0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] 
Exit Share -0.0036 -0.0102** 0.0000 0.0070 -0.0440** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.017] 
HMO Penetration Rate -0.0006*** -0.0009*** 0.0004*** 0.0007*** -0.0010* 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
C-section Choice 0.1160*** 0.5500*** 
[0.003] [0.005] 
Blue Cross 0.0032*** 0.0029*** -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0286*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Observations 875,969 875,969 875,969 875,969 875,969 
R-squared 0.441 0.381 0.018 0.055 0.438 
Market competition index HHI is calculated based on privately insured patients. Regressions also control 
for patient characteristics (Age group 15-25, 26-35, 35 and above, Black, Hispanic, whether the patient is 
referred by physicians, clinic or HMO, admission on Fridays, admission on weekends (Saturday/Sunday), 
emergency admissions, admission via emergency department, whether the patient have a previous c-
section and private insurance type (commercial and blue cross). All regressions also control non-
preventable birth complications and pre-existing medical conditions, and include quarter fixed effects, 
county fixed effects and physician fixed effect. Column 4 and 5 also control for the procedure choice of 
current delivery. The robustness standard errors are clustered at the individual physician level. Hospital 
Expenditures are deflated using 1994 Medical CPI provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and logged. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3 Market Concentration, Jury Friendliness and Health Outcomes 
C-section 
C-section 
without Any 
Preventable 
Birth  
Complications 
Vaginal Birth 
with One or 
More 
Preventable 
Birth 
Complications 
Preventable 
Birth 
Complicatio
ns 
Log(Total 
Hospital 
Expenditures) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D1=(Friendly Juries): Higher Medical Malpractice Liability 
Most Competitive*D1 0.0108*** 0.0119*** -0.0106*** -0.0130*** 0.0131 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.014] 
Very Competitive*D1 0.0061** 0.0094*** -0.0127*** -0.0167*** 0.0194* 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.012] 
Competitive*D1 0.0041* 0.0050** -0.0025 -0.0038 0.0033 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.008] 
D2=(Unfriendly Juries): Lower Medical Malpractice Liability 
Most Competitive*D2 0.0028 -0.0019 -0.0041 0.0002 0.0001 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011] [0.018] 
Very Competitive*D2 0.0023 -0.0014 -0.0034 0.0000 -0.0003 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.012] 
Competitive*D2 0.0020 -0.0008 0.0024 0.0049 -0.0044 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.008] 
Observations 875,969 875,969 875,969 875,969 875,969 
R-square 0.441 0.381 0.018 0.055 0.438 
Market competition index HHI is calculated based on privately insured patients. Regressions also control for 
patient characteristics (Age group 15-25, 26-35, 35 and above, Black, Hispanic, whether the patient is referred 
by physicians, clinic or HMO, admission on Fridays, admission on weekends (Saturday/Sunday), emergency 
admissions, admission via emergency department, whether the patient have a previous c-section and private 
insurance type (commercial and blue cross). All regressions also control non-preventable birth complications 
and pre-existing medical conditions, and include quarter fixed effects and physician fixed effect. Column 4 and 5 
also control for the procedure choice of current delivery. The robustness standard errors are clustered at the 
individual physician level.  Hospital Expenditures are deflated using 1994 Medical CPI provided by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and logged. D1 (higher medical malpractice liability) is one if the county has one jury verdict 
higher than one million dollars during 2000-2003. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4 Market Concentration, Jury Friendliness and Health Outcomes among Patients of Differing 
Health Conditions 
  
C-section Preventable Birth Complications 
Log(Total Hospital 
Expenditures) 
Healthy Sick Healthy Sick Healthy Sick 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
D1=(Friendly Juries): Higher Medical Malpractice Liability 
Most Competitive*D1 0.0041 0.0242*** -0.0149*** -0.0093 0.0108 0.0155 
[0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.014] [0.015] 
Very Competitive*D1 0.0014 0.0158*** -0.0166*** 
-
0.0173**
* 0.0199 0.0172 
[0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.012] [0.012] 
Competitive*D1 0.0005 0.0124*** -0.0070** 0.0016 0.0048 0.0020 
[0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.009] [0.008] 
D2=(Unfriendly Juries): Lower Medical Malpractice Liability 
Most Competitive*D2 0.0046 -0.0072 -0.0040 0.0066 -0.0026 0.0012 
[0.013] [0.022] [0.013] [0.021] [0.020] [0.026] 
Very Competitive*D2 0.0036 0.0019 -0.0023 0.0073 0.0033 -0.0064 
[0.004] [0.007] [0.004] [0.008] [0.012] [0.012] 
Competitive*D2 0.0012 0.0052 0.0014 0.0116* -0.0053 -0.0015 
[0.003] [0.006] [0.003] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] 
Observations 597,449 278,520 597,449 278,520 597,449 278,520 
R-square 0.354 0.421 0.024 0.093 0.369 0.416 
Market competition index HHI is calculated based on privately insured patients. Regressions also 
control for patient characteristics (Age group 15-25, 26-35, 35 and above, Black, Hispanic, whether the 
patient is referred by physicians, clinic or HMO, admission on Friday, admission on weekends 
(Saturday/Sunday), emergency admissions, admission via emergency department, whether the patient 
have a previous c-section and private insurance type (commercial and blue cross). Healthy patients are 
selected if the patient has no recorded pre-existing medical conditions or non-preventable birth 
complications. All regressions on sick patients also control for specific non-preventable birth 
complications and pre-existing medical conditions. In all regressions, I control quarter fixed effects and 
physician fixed effects. Column 3-6 also control for the procedure choice of current delivery. The 
robustness standard errors are clustered at the individual physician level.  Hospital Expenditures are 
deflated using 1994 Medical CPI provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and logged. D1 (higher 
medical malpractice liability) is one if the county has one jury verdict higher than one million dollars 
during 2000-2003. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
'-)!!
 
 
 
Table 3.5 Market Competition, Jury Friendliness and Preventable Birth Complications among Patients with 
and without a Previous C-section 
C-section  Preventable Birth Complication Hospital Charges  
Patients 
with 
Previous 
C-sections 
Patients 
without 
Previous 
C-sections 
Patients 
with 
Previous 
C-sections 
Patients 
without 
Previous 
C-sections 
Patients 
with 
Previous 
C-sections 
Patients 
without 
Previous 
C-sections 
D1=(Friendly Juries): Higher Medical Malpractice Liability 
Most Competitive*D1 0.0162 0.0087*** -0.0156** 
-
0.0126*** -0.0046 0.0152 
[0.012] [0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.016] [0.014] 
Very Competitive*D1 0.0169* 0.0038 -0.0161** 
-
0.0166*** 0.0081 0.0208* 
[0.010] [0.003] [0.007] [0.004] [0.014] [0.012] 
Competitive*D1 0.0127 0.0022 -0.0096* -0.0028 -0.0159 0.0060 
[0.008] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.010] [0.008] 
D2=(Unfriendly Juries): Lower Medical Malpractice Liability 
Most Competitive*D2 -0.0395 0.0075 0.0450* -0.0077 -0.0515 0.0073 
[0.043] [0.012] [0.027] [0.013] [0.031] [0.019] 
Very Competitive*D2 -0.0125 0.0043 0.0078 -0.0009 -0.0066 -0.0009 
[0.013] [0.004] [0.009] [0.004] [0.013] [0.012] 
Competitive*D2 0.0026 0.0009 0.0081 0.0049 -0.0095 -0.0046 
[0.010] [0.003] [0.007] [0.003] [0.010] [0.009] 
Observations 110,038 765,931 110,038 765,931 110,038 765,931 
R-square 0.120 0.378 0.055 0.061 0.401 0.424 
Market competition index HHI is calculated based on privately insured patients. Regressions also control for 
patient characteristics (Age group 15-25, 26-35, 35 and above, Black, Hispanic, whether the patient is 
referred by physicians, clinic or HMO, admission on Fridays, admission on weekends (Saturday/Sunday), 
emergency admissions, admission via emergency department, whether the patient have a previous c-section 
and private insurance type (commercial and blue cross). Healthy patients are selected if the patient has no 
recorded pre-existing medical conditions or non-preventable birth complications. All regressions on sick 
patients also control for specific non-preventable birth complications and pre-existing medical conditions. In 
all regressions, I control quarter fixed effects and physician fixed effects. Column 3-6 also control for the 
procedure choice of current delivery. The robustness standard errors are clustered at the individual physician 
level.  Hospital Expenditures are deflated using 1994 Medical CPI provided by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and logged. D1 (higher medical malpractice liability) is one if the county has one jury verdict 
higher than one million dollars during 2000-2003. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6 Market Concentration, Jury Friendliness and Health Outcomes Before and After MCARE 
Enactment 
  
C-section 
C-section 
without Any 
Preventable 
Birth  
Complications 
Vaginal Birth 
with One or 
More 
Preventable 
Birth 
Complications 
Preventable 
Birth 
Complications 
Log(Total 
Hospital 
Expenditur
es) 
Post 2002 (D1: Higher Medical Malpractice Liability; D2: Lower Medical Malpractice Liability) 
 Most Competitive*D1 0.0249*** 0.0217*** -0.0128*** -0.0125*** 0.0772*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.018] 
 Very Competitive*D1 0.0128*** 0.0149*** -0.0177*** -0.0212*** 0.0404** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.016] 
 Competitive*D1 0.0109*** 0.0085*** -0.0106*** -0.0095*** 0.0387*** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.009]        Most Competitive*D2 0.0162 0.0150 -0.0043 -0.0050 -0.0673** 
[0.018] [0.019] [0.013] [0.016] [0.028] 
Very Competitive*D2 0.0109** 0.0042 -0.0052 0.0003 0.0254 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.019] 
Competitive*D2 0.0111** 0.0028 -0.0069* 0.0002 0.0372*** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.012] 
Prior 2002 (D1: Higher Medical Malpractice Liability; D2: Lower Medical Malpractice Liability) 
 Most Competitive*D1 -0.0045 0.0014 -0.0072 -0.0126** -0.0577*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.015] 
 Very Competitive*D1 -0.0042 0.0021 -0.0075** -0.0133*** -0.0228** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.011] 
 Competitive*D1 -0.0058* -0.0011 0.0043 0.0003 -0.0442*** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.009]        Most Competitive*D2 -0.0034 -0.0081 -0.0035 0.0017 0.0098 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.011] [0.013] [0.021] 
Very Competitive*D2 -0.0005 -0.0032 -0.0046 -0.0018 -0.0013 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.012] 
Competitive*D2 -0.0007 -0.0010 0.0067** 0.0072* -0.0170** 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.009] 
Observations 875,969 875,969 875,969 875,969 875,969 
R-square 0.442 0.381 0.018 0.055 0.440 
Number of markets 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 
Market competition index HHI is calculated based on privately insured patients. Regressions also control for 
patient characteristics (Age group 15-25, 26-35, 35 and above, Black, Hispanic, whether the patient is 
referred by physicians, clinic or HMO, admission on Friday, admission on weekends (Saturday/Sunday), 
emergency admissions, admission via emergency department, whether the patient have a previous c-section 
and private insurance type (commercial and blue cross). Healthy patients are selected if the patient has no 
recorded pre-existing medical conditions or non-preventable birth complications. All regressions on sick 
patients also control for specific non-preventable birth complications and pre-existing medical conditions. In 
all regressions, I control quarter fixed effects and physician fixed effects. Column 3-6 also control for the 
procedure choice of current delivery. The robustness standard errors are clustered at the individual physician 
level.  Hospital Expenditures are deflated using 1994 Medical CPI provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and logged. D1 (higher medical malpractice liability) is one if the county has one jury verdict higher than one 
million dollars during 2000-2003. Years from 1995 to 2002 are defined as "Prior to 2002", and years 2002-
2005 are defined as "After". *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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